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The distribution function has always been a fundamental aspect of 
marketing theory and marketing practice. It will assume a more important 
role relative to other marketing elements during the eighties in response 
to changes in the environment. In particular, greater attention will 
need to be given to the area of channel management on the part of 
suppliers (Laczniak, Lusch, and Udell 1977). 
The environmental changes during the eighties have taken many 
different forms. Retailers have become more powerful and will place 
greater deman~s on suppliers for strategic marketing support. Recent 
trends in product liability litigation necessitate a clearer specifica-
tion of responsibilities among channel members since the action of one 
member may impact upon the potential liability of the others. Economic 
conditions may require that channel members alter the tasks they perform 
in order to be more cost efficient. These and other environmental 
changes will require a reassessment of channel strategy by both 
suppliers and retailers. 
The adaptations to change will likely lead to realignments among 
member firms as to the tasks each is to perform. Given the differing 
economic apd behavioral characteristics associated with alternative 
channel arrangements, one might expect the nature of the realignments 
1 
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to vary across channel types. Thus, a better understanding of the channel 
relationship, as it varies within and across channels, should be of value 
to channel members attempting to play coordinator roles and to those 
firms that may be considering participation within any given channel 
arrangement. 
Much empirical work has been reported on the nature of the channel 
relationship within a distribution system. However, little research has 
focused on the type of distribution channel as the primary unit of 
analysis. Past investigations have typically confined their analysis 
to a single type of channel within a particular industry (Stern and 
Reve 1980). The need for further cross-channel analysis has been 
suggested (Brown 1981). In this regard, Stern and Reve (1980, p. 53) 
have argued as follows: 
Future channel research must focus on making systematic 
comparisons of different distribution networks within and 
between various environmental conditions, irrespective of 
the same industry or across industries. 
This research will systematically examine three different types of 
channel arrangements in the same industry setting. 
Objective and Scope 
Research Objective 
The research reported below is a cross-channel examination of channel 
conflict. It is concerned with the disagreements that arise between 
channel members that are vertically adjacent to one another. Specifi-
cally, attention is focused upon the nature of conflict that occurs 
between retailers and their respective suppliers and the manner by which 
retailers initially attempt to handle these disagreements. It is 
suggested that member firms of alternative channel types will experience 
different problems and resolve them in different ways. 
The marketing policies (issues) that contribute to intrachannel 
conflict are expected to differ across types of channel arrangements. 
Further, the response to these disagreements are likely to vary by type 
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of channel arrangement and by the nature of the power-dependency relation-
ship perceived. The expectation of differences is based on the assumption 
that a channel consists of economic and behavioral determinants that 
interact to affect the nature of channel relations. 
As an economic entity, a channel consists of a network of inter-
dependent firms that specialize as to the economic tasks performed. 
The resulting functional interdependence is viewed as a key characteristic 
of the channel relationship. This interdependency provides the basis 
for viewing a channel as a behavioral system in which conflict is an 
inherent characteristic (Rosenberg and Stern 1970). 
Conflist is formally viewed as a form of opponent-centered 
opposition (Stern, Sternthal, and Craig 1973) that is manifested in the 
form of verbal or written exchanges of disagreements (Lusch 1976a, b). 
These disagreements arise out of a situation of interdependence in 
which one channel member is perceived as interfering with the aims of 
another (Stern and Gorman 1969). 
In this investigation two major categories of hypotheses will be 
considered with respect to channel conflict. The first is based on 
the magnitude of conflict that is experienced by retailers across 
channel types and the types of marketing policies (issues) that 
contribute to disagreements. The second category will examine the manner 
in which retailers attempt to initially resolve these disagreements. 
The form of response to a conflict situation will be viewed as varying 
with the nature of the power-dependency relationship that characterizes 
a given channel arrangement, as well as with the perception of this 
dependency relationship. 
Scope of Research 
Attention will be focused upon the relationship that exists between 
adjacent suppliers and single unit retailers, with retailers serving as 
the unit of analysis in this investigation. For the retailers, data 
will be gathered as to the nature of conflict, the level of perceived 
dependency upon the channel relationship, and the form of response to 
conflict. 
The retailers studied are all involved in the marketing of video 
and audio home electronic products that are selectively or exclusively 
distributed. A high degree of functional interdependence is likely to 
characterize this supplier-dealer arrangement involving limited distri-
bution. If conflict exists, it is more likely to be observed in such a 
situation since interdependence represents an antecedent condition for 
conflict (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974). 
Plan of Study 
A literature review will be provided in Chapter II with respect 
to the current research in the channel field and the research needs 
regarding channel conflict. Particular attention will be given to the 
economic and behavioral characteristics of alternative channel types, 
the nature of channel conflict, and the conditions under which conflict 
response behavior may vary. 
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Based on the literature review, specific research questions will be 
presented in Chapter III. The research procedure to be employed in the 
testing of the hypotheses will also be discussed. 
A presentation of the results of the investigation will be made in 
Chapter IV. This will include an explanation of the research findings 
for each of the hypotheses. 
In Chapter V, the research study will be summarized. Limitations 
and managerial implications of the research will be considered along 
with suggestions for future research. 
5 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature relevant 
to channel conflict. A process model of conflict is employed as a 
framework for organizing the literature. Of interest in the model will 
be the nature of the exchange relationship that exists among channel 
members at a particular point in the process. Special attention is given 
to the existence of manifest (overt) conflict and conflict response 
behavior. 
A channel of distribution can be viewed as both an economic and a 
behavioral system. As an economic collectivity consisting of inter-
dependent firms, one considers the economic functions performed and 
types of alternative vertical channel arrangements. Functional inter-
dependence that results from economic specialization among channel 
members is viewed as a key characteristic of the channel relationship. 
Functional interdependence, itself, provides the basis for viewing 
a channel as a behavioral system in which conflict is an inherent aspect. 
Conflict is conceptualized as a process within which episodes reflecting 
underlying conditions, perceptions, feelings, and behaviors build upon 
one another. Alternative channel types may be characterized as 
possessing predominant sentiments and behaviors that are considered as 
a partial explanation of this process. 
6 
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Conceptually, the conflict process includes alternative responses 
to disagreements. Response may take several forms, including threatening 
or cooperative actions that are designed to modify the behavior of the 
frustrating party. Alternatively, a channel member may modify his own 
behavior to accommodate the other party. 
The nature of conflict response is predicated by each channel 
member's dependence upon the channel relationship. The level of this 
dependency is affected by the nature and importance of the resource 
base that each channel member commands and the availability of alter-
native arrangements. Dependency may take either the form of actual 
economic dependence or of perceived dependency. 
Attention now turns to a discussion of the characteristics of 
alternative channel types and an intensive examination of the channel 
conflict research. 
Channel Characteristics 
In order to fully understand the conflict process within channel 
relationships, one must understand the key aspects of a channel. A 
marketing channel consists of a set of interdependent institutions 
(e.g., manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers) who perform the tasks 
(e.g., production, storage, merchandising) necessary to the delivery 
of goods and services. In the performance of these tasks, both economic 
and behavioral forces influence the relationship between the manufacturer 
and the retailer. 1 
1To maintain consistency throughout this paper the relationship 
between a retailer and a manufacturer will be considered for illustra-
tive purposes. A similar logic could be developed if the manufacturer 
was replaced in the channel relationship by a wholesaler or franchisor. 
• 
Channels as Economic Systems 
As part of any channel arrangements, role (domain) prescriptions 
may develop as to the economic tasks for which each channel member will 
be responsible (i.e., the markets served, products or services offered, 
and activities performed). Such specialization leads to functional 
interdependence among channel members, since each firm will be dependent 
upon the other for access to valued resources (e.g., skills, markets, 
products) necessary to the attainment of their separate goals. 
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Underlying the channel relationship is the idea of external economies 
(Alderson 1965). By holding stocks of goods that are available locally 
to be drawn upon by consumers, a retailer may represent an economical 
alternative to a manufacturer's attempt to achieve direct exchange with 
end-users. Thus, the economic benefits derived from functional 
specialization provides the primary reason for channel formation. 
Any channel relationship can be described in terms of its structure 
(i.e., vertical arrangement) and the processes (i.e., decisional 
mechanisms) that are employed to determine the terms of exchange and to 
coordinate activities among channel members. Structurally, channel 
arrangements may range from a fragmented coalition of 
independently owned, specialized entitites that transact exchange 
across markets (conventional channel) to vertically integrated, wholly-
owned entities that transact exchange among themselves within a 
hierarchy (corporate vertical marketing system) (Stern and Reve 1980). 
Coordination is achieved, respectively, by the market mechanism and 
centralized administrative direction (Etgar 1975). 
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Conventional Channel. A conventional channel consists of a loosely 
aligned network of independent suppliers and resellers. Motivated by 
the profit incentive and the desire to maximize their autonomy, 
conventional members tend to exhibit little concern for adjacent stages 
in the distributive sequence (Thompson 1971). Coordination of channel 
activities is achieved through aggressive bargaining, with the terms of 
exchange being determined by their interaction as independent buyers and 
sellers in an intermediary market (Etgar 1976). Economies that are 
possible through the functional shifting of responsibilities among 
channel members are impeded by their commitments to established patterns 
of operations and responsibilities (McCammon 1970; Stern and El-Ansary 
1977). As a result, this channel form has been described as being 
highly vulnerable to other, more centrally programmed channel systems 
(Thompson 1971). 
Vertical Marketing Systems. In response to the inherent weaknesses 
of conventional channels, vertical marketing systems have emerged as a 
significant form of channel organization. They consist of a network of 
establishments, performing activities at different distributive levels 
(i.e., manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing), that are centrally 
managed as a system to achieve greater economies and market impact. 
McCammon (1970) describes this form of distributive mechanism: 
. vertical marketing systems are rationalized and capital 
intensive networks designed to achieve technological, 
managerial, and promotional economies through the integration, 
coordination, and synchronization of marketing flows from 
points of production to points of ultimate use (p. 43). 
Unlike conventional channels, vertical marketing systems contain a 
locus of power that enables them to better coordinate marketing 
activities (Stern and El-Ansary 1977). Major forms of vertical 
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arrangements include the corporate, the administered, and the contractual 
systems. Within each system, power is generated by different means: 
ownership, expertise, and legal contract, respectively. 
Corporate marketing systems involves the combination of successive 
distributive stages for a given product under a single ownership. A 
typical example includes a manufacturer's forward integration, involving 
the establishment of its own wholesale and/or retail outlets. Ownership 
enables power to be concentrated at one channel level. Through 
corporate directives, maximum control of marketing activities and 
operating economies are possible (Stern and El-Ansary 1977). 
Within an administered system, supplier-developed, tailor-make 
comprehensive programs are employed to influence the merchandising 
behavior of vertically adjacent, autonomous firms for a specified line 
of merchandise (Thompson 1971). Coordination is based upon a supplier's 
expertise and ability to provide valued resources. Such systems have 
been described by Stern and El-Ansary (1977, p. 395) as " ..• conven-
tional channels in which the principles of effective interorganizational 
management have been correctly applied." 
Although autonomous, these firms appear to recognize the need for 
cooperation. Cooperation is reflected in joint efforts that transcend 
the conventional supplier-reseller relationship. Programmed 
merchandising agreements are a product of this cooperation, as 
described below by McCammon (1970): 
Programmed merchandising is a 'joint venture' in which a 
specific retail account and a supplier develop a comprehensive 
merchandising plan to market the supplier's product line. 
These plans normally cover a six-month period but some are 
of longer duration (p. 48). 
Contractual marketing systems consist of independent, vertically 
adjacent channel members, who have combined their resources to achieve 
greater operating economies and marketing impact than is achievable 
through independent action (Thompson 1971). Coordination of marketing 
activities is achieved through formal, long term contractual agreements 
that state the rights and obligations of the parties involved. 
Franchise operations provide a typical example. 
Channels as Behavioral Systems 
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While channel relations may be described in terms of economic 
considerations, they may also be viewed from a broader, behavioral 
perspective. Existence of a dependency relationship suggests that if 
each firm is to attain their separate goals, each must take into account 
the behavior of the other. Such reasoning has led to the acceptance of 
a channel of distribution as a behavioral system (Alderson 1965; 
Rosenberg and Stern 1970; Reve and Stern 1979). 
A mixture of both conflict and cooperation is inherent in a 
behavioral-economic distributive system that is characterized by inter-
dependence (Reve and Stern 1979). Necessary to the accomplishment of 
distributive tasks is a minimum level of cooperation, without which 
the channel would be ineffective (Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1975-1976). 
Conflict, in turn, is the potential outcome of the same dependency 
relationship (Rosenberg and Stern 1970; Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974). 
That is, a retailer's dependency upon a manufacturer creates the 
opportunity for the manufacturer to interfere with the aims of the 
former. When interference is perceived, conflict will develop. 
Although conflict and cooperation will exist simultaneously in all 
channels, the nature of the predominant sentiments and behaviors that 
tend to characterize channel interactions may vary with the type of 
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vertical economic arrangement employed. Supplier-reseller relationships 
that are ordered by long-term contracts (i.e., contractual vertical 
marketing systP.ms, such as franchises) tend to be characterized more 
by cooperative sentiments (Stern and Reve 1980). Alternatively, 
autonomous entities, such as conventional channel members, tend to 
exhibit less cooperative behavior (McCammon 1970). 
Conventional Channel Sentiments. Alderson (1965) and McVey (1960) 
recognized that a channel may be loosely aligned, 2 consisting of 
independent and idiosyncratic middlemen--each desiring to maximize their 
autonomy. Autonomous firms tend to have their own goals which are 
shaped by managerial preferences and the task environment in which they 
operate. McVey (!960) suggests that these independent retailers may be 
more preoccupied with their internal operations than with the channel 
as a whole. Instead of viewing themselves as a "link" in the channel, 
as a selling agent for the manufacturer, these retailers consider 
themselves primiarly as purchasing agents for their customers. Therefore, 
they are not likely to be motivated to provide the level of cooperation 
desired by manufacturers unless given the economic incentive to do so 
(McVey 1960; McCammon and Little 1965). 
This coalition of isolated and autonomous firms typifies the 
traditional or conventional marketing channel. Such entities appear to 
be emotionally committed to the status quo. That is, they tend to have 
well established ideas as to what activities should be performed by 
2The fact that a channel is loosely aligned does not invalidate 
the view that a channel may be considered an "organized behavioral 
system" (Stern and Reve 1980; Reve and Stern 1979; Gattorna 1978), to 
the extent that interdependencies exist between firms. 
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various parties (McCammon 1970; Stern and El-Ansary 1977). As a result, 
attempts torealign responsibilities to take advantage of changes in the 
task enviornment will often lead to conflict. 
Possessing a lower level of commitment to the channel (Stern and 
El-Ansary 1977), conventional channel members are likely to exhibit a 
low level of tolerance for conflict. As a result, disagreements are 
likely to be manifested in terms of more immediate and intense conflict 
responses (Brown 1980), with those responses being characterized by 
uncooperative and aggressive behavior. 
Contractual Channel Sentiments. In contrast, members of vertical 
marketing systems are more likely to view themselves as part of the 
channel and exhibit a relatively higher level of cooperative behavior. 
Weik (1971), in an empirical study of channel member's attitudes, found 
vertical system members to be more cooperative and innovative. Unlike 
their counterparts in conventional arrangements, they tended to identify 
more with other members in the channel and stress a more integrative 
planning and decision making mode of behavior. 
Compared to the more rigid, traditional attitudes that characterize 
conventional members, vertical marketing system members tend to exhibit 
relatively more open and flexible attitudes toward change (McCammon 
1970; Etgar 1978). This should serve to facilitate, with less conflict, 
the functional shifting of responsibilities that may be necessitated by 
change in the environment. Differences in role perceptions, as 
described by Etgar (1978) may help explain such behavior: 
In conventional channels one can expect that the role 
perceptions of the channel members are more traditional and 
reflect well established ideas as to what activities 
manufacturers, wholesales, and dealers should perform. In 
contractual channels novel, nontraditional role perceptions 
can be expected to prevail to a larger extent (p. 52). 
Channel interaction between vertical system members may be 
characterized by conflict of a less intense nature. Weik's (1971) 
findings suggest that as vertical integration (i.e., level of coordi-
nation) increases in a channel, conflict is significantly reduced 
(Rosson and Sweitzer 1979). Channel participants may be induced to 
actively reduce conflict when it emerges because the fate of their firm 
is felt to be linked with others in the channel arrangement. Thus, 
members of vertical marketing systems may exhibit a greater tolerance 
for conflict and a more cooperative response to disagreements when they 
do occur. 
Channel Conflict 
The concept of conflict was used above as one aspect of the 
behavioral dimension of channel relationships. This section of the 
chapter will examine conflict in more detail as a process. 
Conflict: An Overview 
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The concept of conflict is somewhat ambignous having been referred 
to in a number of ways within the literature. Within a channel of dis-
tribution, conflict has been conceptualized as a process of change 
(Stern and Gorman 1969), a situation of interdependency (Firat, Tybout, 
and Stern 1974), perceptual differences as to issues (Rosenberg and 
Stern 1971), a struggle or clash occasioned by differences in opinions, 
goals, or attitudes (Pearson 1971), an adversary relationship (Rosenberg 
and Stern 1970), the frequency of disagreements (Lusch 1976a, b), and 
as the evaluation of incompatible goals (Brown 1978). 
Consistent with these diverse views is the conceptualization of 
conflict as a dynamic process (Brown 1977). Such a view provides a 
framework by which the various aspects of conflict can be integrated. 
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As a process, conflict consists of a series of episodes that builds upon 
one another; where the episodes reflect underlying conditions, percep-
tions, feelings, behaviors and the outcomes of conflict (Pondy 1967; 
Brown 1978). 
This process view, which forms the basis for intrachannel conflict 
models (Stern and Gorman 1969; Rosenberg and Stern 1970; Firat, Tybout, 
and Stern 1974; Rosenberg 1974; Brown 1978; Cadotte and Stern 1979; 
Etgar 1979), was originally described by Pondy (1967) in his model of 
intraorganizational conflict and was later adapted to the area of 
distribution by Stern and Gorman (1969). Channel conflict was concep-
tualized by the latter as a process of change: (1) a change that causes 
disagreements, and (2) a change in response to disagreements that leads 
to either constructive or destructive consequences. 
A general model of the conflict process is illustrated in Figure 1. 
It will serve as an organizing framework for the discussion that follows. 
Interdependence provides the antecedent or underlying condition for 
conflict. That is, a reseller's dependence upon a supplier enables 
the latter to interfere with the aims of the former. Attempts by one 
channel member to realign functional responsibilities and to take 
advantage of changes in the task environment may interfere with the 
attainment of another's goals. When interference is perceived, a 
sence of frustration and hostile feelings toward one another may develop 
(i.e., affective conflict) leading to exchanges of verbal or written 
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how it is handled, may vary with the nature of the power-dependence 
relationship that characterizes the channel arrangement. This relates 
to the resources brought to the relationship and their perceived value. 
The outcome of conflict may be either destructive or constructive 
(Rosenbloom 1973; Assael 1969). Destructive (dysfunctional) conflict 
may take the form of lower channel cooperation, duplication of efforts 
and resulting diseconomies, and even the eventual disintegration of the 
channel relationship. Alternatively, conflict may have constructive 
(functional) consequences, to the extent that channel members are 
motivated to review and improve the quality of their relationship. 
Attention now turns to a more in-depth discussion of these conflict 
components. 
Conflict Episodes 
Firms operate in a dynamic environment, which has implications for 
the nature of the channel relationship (Assael 1969; Etgar 1977). Stern 
and Gorman (1969) consider conflict to be an outcome of changes in the 
channel or its environment. 
Conflict is viewed here as a process of changes--
changes in the task environment, within individual firms 
in a channel system, and/or in the relationships between 
the elements of the environment and channel members--
which induce realignments in the relationship between 
channel system members (p. 157). 
As conditions change, channel members may be motivated to take 
advantage of the situation by altering their goals, in the form of 
markets served or functions performed. To the extent that these new 
objectives and role expectations are incompatible with those held by 
others, the potential for conflict will exist. However, unless this 
incompatibility is perceived, the conflict process will remain 
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inactive (Brown 1978). For example, in response to adverse economic 
conditions, manufacturers have recently attempted to reduce service to 
retailers. Since retailers would be forced to adapt to this new policy, 
via internal adjustments in inventory levels and ordering policies, the 
potential for conflict has been created. 
As suppliers attempt to implement new goals, the underlying nature 
of these objectives may become known to resellers. It is the behavioral 
influence patterns employed by the supplier in implementing his goals 
that contribute to an awareness on the part of the retailer. A perceived 
conflict condition will emerge when the latter perceives the policies 
(issues) and/or actions of the former as being incompatible (Brown 1978). 
Thus, procedures employed to implement these new objectives, and not the 
goals, create the opportunity for interference and conflict. Stern 
and Gorman (1969) explain: 
Goals are not the cause of conflict; it is the behavior 
patterns pursued to achieve goals that interfere with goal 
attainment of other system members. It is true that goals 
produce behavior, but it is behavior, not the goals, which 
frustrates (p. 163). 
Misunderstandings of each others' actual position on channel matters 
are likely to contribute to a conflictual condition. That is, aretailer's 
evaluation of the received influence pressures may be mediated by 
differences in perceptions of the task environment (Rosenberg and 
Stern 1970), differing channel member motivations (Wittreich 1962), 
lack of relevant information (Stern and Gorman 1969), differing role 
expectations (Stern and Heskett 1969), and the use of confusing 
language (Wittreich 1962). As a result, incompatibility, and thus 
conflict, may be perceived even when there is no underlying basis for 
it in reality. 
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Divergence in goals and perceptions, along with perceptions of the 
outcomes of past disagreements, are likely to influence the level of 
tension that is generated. At this stage, conflict may become person-
alized and hostile feelings develop. Such a condition is referred to as 
affective conflict (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974; Brown 1977). Hostile 
feelings are likely to remain contained (covert) until some event or 
incident serves to intensify the situation and trigger an overt response. 
Conditions within the channel or the environment may serve to 
intensify the conflict situation, motivating the firm to respond to 
perceived (covert) conflict. This flare-up, according to Rosenberg 
(1974, p. 69), may be triggered by an incident involving" .• a con-
frontation between two parties, a reckoning necessitated by some report, 
or a threshold reached where tension can no longer be contained." 
Conflict may be manifested in the form of verbal or written exchanges of 
disagreements (Lusch 1976a, b). These behaviors may range from mild to 
violent actions. 
The level of manifest conflict is likely to depend upon the 
frequency and intensity of disagreements (Lusch 1976b). However, it will 
also depend upon the nature of the policies (issues) over which disagree-
ments occur. Brown and Day (1981) point this out as follows: 
Even though disagreements over a particular issue may be 
frequent, the impact of such conflict may be small if the 
issue is of little or no importance to the parties concerned. 
In contrast, even a few disagreements over very important 
issues may create a large amount of conflict (p. 264). 
Policies (issues) differ in their ability to impede or facilitate 
goal attainment, which may reflect the relative importance or stakes 
attached to each issue. For instance, a reseller may allow a manufacturer 
to exercise control over product-related issues because of the latter's 
engineering and marketing expertise in the product area, yet resist 
attempts by the manufacturer to extend its influence beyond this area. 
To the retailer in a conventional channel, issues related to store 
operations would not normally be associated with the traditional role 
of the manufacturer. Any attempt to influence this area would likely 
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be regarded as a threat to a retailer's autonomy and would encounter 
resistance. Alternatively, direct managerial assistance involving store 
operations may encounter less conflict in a contractual (e.g., franchise) 
arrangement because it is expected (Etgar 1978). 
The intensity of disagreements may also vary across channel types. 
The predominant sentiments that characterize channel structure may 
account for this. For instance, contractual members, unlike their 
conventional counterparts, may exhibit a greater tolerance for conflict. 
Possessing a relatively greater commitment to the channel arrangement, 
vertical system members may have learned to better cope with conflict 
by developing specific methods of dealing with it (Rosenberg 1971). 
Since conflict may be affected by the outcome of past disagreements and 
by the stake that one has in the arrangement, this may serve to lessen 
the intensity of disagreements and the amount of conflict currently 
experienced in a vertical marketing system. 
Conflict has been defined primarily in terms of disagreements that 
arise out of a process, in which the aims of a channel member are 
frustrated by changes in the channel or environment. This process may 
be conceptually expanded to include changes in response to those 
disagreements (Stern and Gorman 1969). To this end, we now turn our 
attention to an examination of response behavior to conflict. 
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Response Behavior 
Response to a conflict situation may take various forms. In an 
attempt to bilaterally resolve disagreements, channel members may employ 
various bargaining strategies. These are designed to modify the 
behavior of the frustrating party. Alternatively, channel members may 
be acquiescent. That is, a firm modifies its own behavior by unilaterally 
accommodating the other party. 
The type of response behavior that is employed will vary with the 
nature of the dependency relationship that characterizes alternative 
channel types, as well as by perception's of this relationship. 
Dependency, in turn, will vary directly with the importance of the 
channel arrangement and inversely with the availability of alternative 
arrangements. 
Bargaining 
Bargaining represents a primary mode of channel interaction (Roering 
1977) that underlies conflict response within both conventional and 
vertical marketing systems (Angelmar and Stern 1978). Although 
associated primarily with the achievement of coordination in conventional 
channels (McCammon 1970), Angelmar and Stern (1978) argue below that 
bargaining may be found in vertically integrated channels. 
one may argue that bargining takes place even in 
integrated channels, for 'no matter what conflict manage-
ment mechanism is adopted by policy-makers within a 
channel, resolution is always the result of bargaining--
the making of commitments, offering of rewards, or 
threatening of punishments of deprivation--between and 
among members' (p. 93). 
Bargining involves a process whereby channel members interact in the 
development of possible agreements that may serve to resolve conflict 
and guide future behavior. Mixed emotions, consisting of both cooper-
ation and self-interest, are involved in this process (Stern 1971; 
Dwyer and Walker 1981) and respectively reflect the interdependencies 
that exist between firms and the individual firm's desire to maintain 
its autonomy (Reve and Stern 1980). 
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The simultaneous exercise of power and accommodation is evident in 
bargaining (Walker 1971). In the belief that a mutually beneficial 
agreement within an acceptable range of possible solutions may be 
better than no solution, channel participants may be motivated to 
cooperate by making some concessions. Yet, at the same time, a channel 
member will exercise the use of their power to attain competing interests 
regarding the specific terms of that agreement. 
Although the terms "negotiation" and "bargaining" have been used 
interchangeably in the channel literature, a distinction between them 
may be made. Negotiation has been referred to as a form of bargaining 
involving verbal communications. Bargaining has been defined as also 
including nonverbal actions (Pruitt 1972). While the focus of the 
channel literature has emphasized verbal communications (Walker 1971; 
Angelmar and Stern 1978: Roering 1977; Dwyer and Walker 1981), both 
terms have been used to describe the same thing. Consistent with this 
practice, both terms will be used interchangeably to describe the same 
phenomenon. 
Bargaining modes will vary in their orientation. That is, the 
specific actions that are employed initially in response to conflict 
may be competitive or cooperative in nature. They may vary as to the 
level of concessions that are made. These alternative response modes 
are considered below. 
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Competitive Bargaining Behavior. Competitive behavior tends to be 
individualistic in nature, focusing upon the satisfaction of one's own 
interests. Attempts to impose one's views through the use of persuasion, 
threats, or commands characterize this mode of response (Pruitt and 
Lewis 1975). 
In response to conflict involving a supplier's attempt to alter a 
dealer's level of inventory, a dealer may employ threatening actions to 
resolve the disagreement. Possessing scarce and valued resources 
(e.g., retail floor space), the dealer may attempt to modify the 
supplier's behavior by threatening to deny the latter access to these 
resources. The importance of the floor space and the degree to which 
alternative area dealers are lacking may force the supplier to reconsider 
its actions. 
Attempts to secure the backing of relevant third parties also 
characterizes this form of behavior. In response to a conflict situ-
ation, channel members may look to dealer or trade associations, or 
even the courts to protect their interests. 
Competitive bargaining behavior also tends to be inflexible, 
reflecting preconceived ideas or commitments (Stern 1971). For example, 
retailers of multiple brands may jealously safeguard their autonomy by 
arguing that. they are unable to satisfy the expectations of a supplier 
without earning the displeasure of others. Such behavior represents a 
commitment to the status quo and a barrier to change (Stern 1971). 
Cooperative Bargaining Behavior. Cooperative (integrative) 
bargaining is characterized by a problem solving approach that attempts 
to find mutually satisfactory solutions to conflict. Issues are usually 
viewed as problems to be solved, rather than as solutions that must be 
accepted by another. Such views lend themselves to more flexible 
behavior, in which coercion, such as threats and commands, is avoided 
(Pruitt 1972). 
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Dialogue in cooperative bargaining tends to be open and focuses upon 
the issues and an-exploration of possible options. In fact, a number of 
issues may be considered simultaneously; allowing tradeoffs, in which one 
firm's concessions on an issue are exchanged for another's concessions 
on another issue (Pruitt and Lewis 1975). Information tends to be freely 
and accurately exchanged so that the preferences and needs of the parties 
may be considered and integrated into a solution that is mutually 
beneficial (Pruitt 1972; Stern 1971). 
As an example of cooperative bargaining, a supplier's request for a 
speedier payment of a dealer's account may result in disagreement. The 
dealer may resist, arguing that times are bad and that he is unable to do 
better. Instead of threatening the dealer, further dialogue may reveal 
that both are faced with the same problem--slow paying accounts. A 
dealer's slow payment might be attributable to his own slow paying 
customers, who tend to use the retailer's store charge account. The 
supplier may suggest that this credit program be replaced with a bank 
credit card system. As a result, the dealer's cash flow and associated 
ability to pay the supplier more quickly might be improved. Thus, the 
willingness of both parties to discuss the issue and consider each other's 
viewpoint results in an equitable solution to a problem shared by both. 
Acquiescent Response 
Rather than attempt to modify the behavior of another, a channel 
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member may yield completely to the wishes of the frustrating party. 
Unlike bargaining, acquiescence may be viewed as a form of intrafirm 
change in which accommodation is complete and unilateral. 
Within a contractual channel for automobiles, characterized by an 
asymmetrical power relationship, acquiescence was often employed by the 
subordinate channel member as a means of attempting to reduce channel 
conflict. As Brown (1979) suggests, this may be explained by the nature 
of power-dependence relationships. 
Asymmetries in the balance of power within automobile 
channels might account for this result. Perhaps dealers 
feel that the manufacturers' size and expertise enable them 
to 'know best' how to distribute automobiles. Dealers may 
also view continuing a disagreement with the manufacturer 
as being futile. Even worse, they may believe that by 
continuing a disagreement, the manufacturer might impose 
sanctions upon them (p. 498). 
Determinants of Response 
A channel member's choice of response to conflict is likely to vary 
with his degree of dependence upon the channel relationship. Dependency 
is associated inversely with the availability of alternative avenues 
of goal attainment, such as other channel arrangements (El-Ansary 
and Stern 1972). A retailer with available alternative sources of 
supply would be expected to bargain more competitively and disruptively. 
Alternatively, such competitive behavior would be expected to occur less 
frequently for a dealer that finds himself dependent upon the channel 
relationship for valued resources (Roering 1977). 
In terms of channel structure, members of vertically integrated 
channels are more likely to view themselves as part of the channel than 
will members of conventional channels (Thompson 1971). Given the 
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importance of continuing the relationship, a high level of dependency 
may be perceived and cooperative bargaining behavior should result. 
Conventional channel members will commit to their own self-interest and 
more competitive bargaining should characterize their response behavior. 
Structurally-derived power may define the potential for, but not the 
actual use of influence. ·As Firat, Tybout, and Stern (1974) suggest, it 
is perceived relative power, rather than objective power that directs a 
firm's response to conflict. 
Perception of self and other firm power may interact to affect the 
nature of this response (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974). Since dependency 
3 may serve as an index of power (El-Ansary 1975), the specific nature of 
a channel member's (reseller's) response is likely to be influenced by 
the degree to which it perceived itself to be dependent upon another 
(supplier), as well as by the degree to which the supplier is perceived 
by the reseller to be dependent upon it for valued resources. 
Perceived Asymmetrical Relationship. In a position of unbalanced 
power where one channel member perceived itself as being more dependent 
upon the channel arrangement than the other (subordinate position), 
response to conflict is likely to be characterized by more frequently 
attempted communications, a higher level of accommodation and attempts 
to bargain cooperatively. Weaker bargainers may tend to communicate 
more freely to compensate for their relative lack of power (Dwyer and 
Walker 1981). Likewise, since they perceive themselves as being more 
3Note that the power that a channel member (e.g., supplier) has 
over another (e.g., reseller) may be viewed as being related to the 
dependence that the latter (reseller) has upon the former. 
dependent upon the relationship, they are likely to bargain more 
cooperatively (Roering 1977). 
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Demanding-threatening actions by the weaker party in a channel 
would not be expected due to the perceived costs involved (Firat, Tybout, 
and Stern 1974). Since the other party is viewed as being less dependent 
upon the relationship it will have a higher perceived probability of 
retaliating in response to threatening moves and so, the weaker member 
would have to employ a larger proportion of his smaller resource base to 
subdue possible resistance (Korpi 1974). Further, the subordinate member 
will tend to enact a greater number of responses or make other changes 
which the more dominant party desires (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Brown 
1979). 
In a position of unbalartced power where one channel member perceives 
another to be more dependent upon the channel arrangement than itself 
(dominant position), conflict response is likely to be characterized 
by fewer attempts to bargain cooperatively and greater use of demanding-
threatening actions and normative appeals. Dominant channel members 
tend to employ more demanding means of influence in response to conflict 
(Wilkinson and Kipnis 1978). Lacking a high level of perceived 
dependency, less restraint is likely to exist over the use of competitive 
bargining behavior (Dwyer and Walker 1981). Further, normative appeals 
that stress the expectation of "p-roper" behavior may be employed as a 
unifying and cooperation-inducing force (Stern and Reve 1980). 
Perceived Symmetrical Relationship. In a balanced, high dependency 
position for both channel members, response to conflict is likely to be 
of a more cooperative nature. Both firms may tend to avoid demanding-
threatening actions that could prompt retaliation (Dwyer and Walker 1981). 
This may be due to the high costs, in terms of the resources that would 
be required to resolve the situation (Korpi 1974). 
Since dependence reflects a channel member's commitment to and 
stake in the relationship (El-Ansary and Stern 1972), this commitment 
should serve as a restraint on the use of more coercive means of 
influence (Dwyer and Walker 1981). With their fate perceived as being 
linked to another, more cooperative behavior should be exhibited. 
In a balanced, low dependency position where neither party is 
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highly dependent upon the other, response to conflict is likely to be 
characterized by competitive bargaining behavior and a low level of 
cooperation. In fact, retailers may jealously safeguard their autonomy 
by arguing that they are unable to satisfy the expectations of a supplier 
without earning the displeasure of other suppliers. 
Initial responses may not be as demanding or threatening as that 
which typifies the unbalanced, dominant situation. This may be explained 
by the retailer's low perceived ability to successfully exercise power 
given the other's availability of alternative channel arrangements. If 
conflict continues, the relationship may eventually be dissolved by the 
replacement of the present channel member with another. 
Determinants of Dependency 
It has been stated that the level of perceived dependency is likely 
to be influenced by the nature and importance of the resource base that 
each channel member commands. Since a supplier's offering of valued 
resources provides a means of mediating a retailer's achievement of its 
economic goals, a closer look at the resource base underlying dependency 
is merited. These power-generating resources are viewed as emanating 
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from a channel member's economic strength and position in the channel 
(Little 1970). 
Positional Strength of Manufacturers. Unique to the manufacturer is 
the power-generating resource that emanates from the firm's positional 
role in the channel--that of product development. A well differentiated 
product represents a source which might be employed to increase a 
retailer's dependency upon the manufacturer (Beier and Stern 1969). 
Retail accounts may tend to identify with and wish to be associated with 
such experts, conferring upon the manufacturer the "right" to dictate the 
manner in which the product should be sold. As Stern and El-Ansary 
(1977) explain, such a possibility may be a manifestation of a 
manufacturer's legitimate, referent, and. expert power: 
The manufacturer with an outstanding product may have, 
from the perspective of those purchasing it, a 'right' to 
dictate how it should be sold and consumed, an image with 
which others seek to identify, and probably a greater 
assumed knwoledge about the market for his product than 
anyone else (p. 433). 
Channel power will be determined by the degree of differentiation 
that a product possesses. Successful differentiation has the effect of 
creating a consumer following and a lessening of the substitutability 
of the product. As a result, the number of acceptable supply sources 
available to the retailer will be reduced and the retailer's dependence 
upon the manufacturer will be increased. 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a wide, well-
differentiated product line that possesses a range of features and 
price lines would enhance a retailer's dependence upon the supplier. 
However, gaps within the line would diminish the power base. Retailers 
may feel vulnerable being dependent upon a single incomplete line while 
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competing retailers handle another supplier's more complete line 
(Rosenberg 1971). To remedy this, the retailers may drop the incomplete 
line or handle other brands. 
Although a highly differentiated product and line may enable a 
manufacturer to extend its domain of power (i.e., the number of middle-
men over which it exercises control), the scope of this power (i.e., the 
issues over which control is successfully exercised) may be limited 
(Beier and Stern 1969). A manufacturer may exercise control over 
product-related issues because of its engineering and marketing expertise, 
yet encounter resistance should it attempt to extend its influence to 
other issues not associated with the perceived role of the manufacturer 
(Etgar 1978). Thus, policy areas in which control may be exercised 
successfully would appear to be limited and be dependent upon the • 
perceived role associated with each member in the channel. 
Furthermore, as products mature the exclusiveness of a product 
would tend to depreciate with the greater availability of substitutes. 
With less uncertainty surrounding the product, there would be less need 
for retailers to rely upon the manufacturer's product-related expertise. 
Hence, the manufacturer's product-related power base would be weakened 
(Little 1970). A greater reliance upon the firm's economic strength 
would be needed to offset this loss in positional strength. Given the 
availability of alternative sources, greater assistances (e.g., attrac-
tive price margins, increased promotional effort) would be necessary to 
keep retailers satisfied. 
Positional Strength of Retailers. Retailers have at their disposal 
a variety of means by which their position may be enhanced (Stern and 
El-Ansary 1977) •• Unique to the retailer is the power-generating 
resource that emanates from its positional role in the channel--the 
performance of local merchandising activities. Because of their access 
to local markets, retailers represent "gatekeepers" as to which brands 
will obtain the scarce resource--floor space, that they have to offer. 
Since a store's reputation and image may reflect upon the quality and 
image of a product (Porter 1974), retailers may be selectively choosen 
by suppliers upon that basis. The greater the store's reputation, the 
more valuable will be the floor space that a dealer has to offer and 
the greater the supplier's dependence upon the retailer. 
In the marketing of durable goods, a retailer may represent a 
proxy for some of the product attributes desired by consumers. Since 
such purchases may be considered relatively important, consumers will 
expend effort in comparing products as to a number of characteristics. 
Consumers not only seek the physical attributes that a product may 
offer, but also intangibles (e.g., availability of service, credit, 
delivery) that a retailer may offer that are capable of enhancing the 
total package of benefits received. By differentiating this package 
of benefits, through promotion and service, a dealer may be able to 
establish stronger patronage motives whereby the identity of the store 
exceeds the importance of the identity of a particular brand within 
that store (Porter 1974). This would tend to decrease the retailer's 
dependency upon the supplier's brand. 
Although a consumer may have in mind a particular brand, he may 
consider others. Within a store, a retailer may be able to influence 
the sale of a particular brand through the information provided in a 
sales presentation or advice solicited by a consumer. This would serve 




A dealer's power position may be further enhanced by the level of 
its expertise. Because of their proximity to local markets, retailers 
may be in a position to more effectively accumulate information 
concerning the needs and compliants of consumers. Often they may be the 
first to learn of competitive developments. Communications of such 
knowledge enables a dealer to mediate the manufacturer's ability to 
achieve its economic goals. 
Bennion (1980) has recently suggested that the scope of a 
manufacturer's power that emanates from a well-differentiated product 
may be attenuated by the remainder of that line as it becomes more 
substitutable. Unless the entire line is well-differentiated it may 
require extensive dealer support for economic success. To the extent 
that the more substitutable products are of importance to the producer, 
dealers may be able to enhance their position by mediating the 
resources (e.g., floor space) necessary for those products to be a 
success. 
Thus, it would appear that the resource base that each channel 
members commands plays a role in determining the nature of the power-
dependency relationship. Dependency should vary directly with the 
importance of a channel arrangement and inversely with the availability 
of alternative, feasible arrangements. The importance of a channel 
arrangement, and the commitment to and stake in that relationship, may 
be enhanced by a channel member's ability to mediate values resources. 
Research Directions 
The general area of channel conflict has received extensive research 
attention, as is evident from the literature review. However, further 
cross-channel research is needed. 
Past investigations of the channel relationship have typically 
confined their analysis to a single type of distribution channel within 
a particular industry (Rosson and Sweitzer 1979). The exceptions are 
few in number (Weik 1971; Etgar 1976, 1978; Kelly and Peters 1977; 
Brown 1981). In essence, the investigations represent little more than 
case studies in which the findings are difficult to generalize beyond 
the channel type or industry considered. 
A single empirical study (Kelly and Peters 1977) has claimed to 
investigate channel conflict in a cross-channel setting. Although 
different channel types were identified, only a single type of channel 
was examined within each industry considered; and these were not held 
constant across all industries. Without a systematic comparison of 
differing channel arrangements within the same industry the external 
validity of the findings may be questioned. 
Interchannel differences are likely to be observed with respect to 
the marketing policies (issues) that are the focal points of the 
conflict. This is due to the nature of the business customs and role 
expectations that are associated with alternative channel types (Etgar 
1978). Thus, an investigation of the comflict associated with various 
issues over different channel settings should contribute to knowledge 
in the field. 
How channel members respond to a conflict situation may differ 
across channels, depending upon the nature of the power-dependency 
relationship (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974). Although response is 
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an important aspect of channel relations, empirical research has largely 
ignored the handling of conflict among channel members (Brown 1979). 
While several studies have examined conflict management methods 
in experimental settings (Hunger and Stern 1976; Stern, Sternthal, and 
Craig 1973), only a single study has examined conflict response 
behavior in an actual channel setting (Brown 1979). However, due to 
the single channel type considered in Brown's study, generalizations 
of the findings to other types of channel situations are precluded. 
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Based on the above observations, a cross-channel analysis of channel 
conflict and resultant responses of channel members to conflict is 
warranted. Furthermore, by examining alternative types of distribution 
channels within a given industry, environmental and product-related 
factors may be held constant. The latter condition will enable one 
to examine a clear cross-channel comparison of conflict-related 
variables. 
The study will investigate differing channel types within the same 
industry. Particular attention will be given to conflict, as it is 
manifested in the form of verbal or written disagreements, and to the 
nature of initial responses that are elicited by these disagreements. 
Based on the previous literature review, hypotheses will be developed 
and presented in the next chapter together with the methodology employed 




The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research design that 
will be employed in this investigation. First, the objective and scope 
of this research will be discussed. Formal research hypotheses will 
then be presented based upon the channel conflict literature previously 
described. Data collection procedures will then be considered. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the relevant theoretical concepts 
and their operational measurement definitions. Finally, the method of 
statistical analysis will be presented. 
Objective and Scope 
The overall objective of this cross-channel study is to examine the 
nature of conflict that exists between retailers and their suppliers and 
the retailers' method of handling these disagreements. Of particular 
interest is the relationship that (1) exists between an adjacent 
supplier (e.g., manufacturer, franchisor) and a retailer; where (2) these 
channel members are involved in the marketing of products that are 
selectively or exclusively distributed through (3) single unit retailers, 
in which (4) the product category represents an important or dominant 
part of that retailer's business. Such distributive arrangements (i.e., 
limited distribution) are generally characterized by a high degree of 
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functional interdependence. Since interdependence is the antecedent 
condition for conflict (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974), channel conflict 
is more likely to be observed in the situation described. 
Although the nature of the channel relationship is dyadic, data 
will be gathered only from the retailer's perspective. That is, the 
retailer will serve as the unit of analysis. This is consistent with 
most of the studies in channel research. Budget limitations on the 
research preclude examining the relationship from both the supplier and 
retailer's point of view. 
Research Hypotheses 
Two categories of hypotheses are presented based upon a literature 
review of the conflict process. The first category deals with the 
nature of channel conflict, while the second considers the manner in 
which retailers attempt initially to resolve it. 
Conflict will be considered at the manifest stage, whereby the 
conflict among channel members is expressed in the form of verbal or 
written disagreements. Here, one might be concerned with the magnitude 
of conflict that is experienced by dealers across channel types and 
with the types of issues that contribute to this conflict. 
The form of response that is employed by dealers in their attempt 
initially to resolve disagreements with their suppliers will also be 
studied. The form of response is likely to be associated with the 
nature of the power-dependency relationship that characterizes a given 
channel type, as well as with perceptions of this dependency relation-
ship. These research questions are presented below as formal hypotheses, 
stated in their alternative form. 
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Aggregate Conflict 
Channel conflict may be expected to vary across channel types. 
Conventional channel members are likely to exhibit a higher level of 
conflict in response to changes in the channel and the environment. 
Committed primarily to their own self-interest, they are more likely 
to perceive change as a threat to their autonomy. Unlike their counter-
parts in a vertical marketing system, they possess more of a traditional 
orientation and have well established ideas as to which channel 
activities should be performed by various parties (Etgar 1978). This 
resistance to change should serve to create a greater intensity of 
disagreements within this type of channel arrangement, thereby contri-
buting to a high level of conflict. 
The opposite is true of vertically integrated channel members. 
Although an asymmetrical system (e.g., franchise) may have the "potential" 
for conflict (Stern and Reve 1980), and even though member firms may tend 
to communicate more frequently to compensate for their subordinate 
position (Dwyer and Walker 1981), the level of actual conflict may be 
less. Possessing a greater system-wide orientation, these firms may have 
learned to cope with conflict by developing methods to handle it 
(Rosenberg 1971). The outcomes of these past disagreements and the 
high level of commitment to the channel may contribute to less intense 
future disagreements and a lower level of conflict. Based on this 
reasoning, the following research hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis I: The magnitude of intrachannel conflict perceived 
by retailers will differ by type of channel 
structure. Channel members in conventional 
channel arrangements will tend to perceive a high 




The marketing policies (issues) that contribute to intrachannel 
conflict may differ by type of channel structure. Since aggregate 
conflict may conceal some interesting interchannel differences, 
attention will be given to individual and sets of interrelated issues. 
Individual Conflict Issues. Individual policies are likely to vary 
as to their ability to impede or facilitate a dealer's goal attainment, 
depending upon the channel conditions in which they are found. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, a supplier's attempt to influence 
store operations may be expected and even desired by a franchisee, yet 
be viewed by a conventional channel member as a threat to its autonomy. 
When interference with one's aims is perceived, conflict is the result. 
The role of individual policies in channel conflict is examined in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis II-A: The magnitude of conflict that is experienced 
on individual policies will differ among channel 
types. 
Types of Conflict Issues. The set of separate issues may be more 
parsimoniously summarized into a smaller set of issue types that 
reflect the same underlying form of conflict. It is likely that 
conflict will differ across channels with respect to these newly 
discovered types of issues. 
Interchannel differences may be explained by the differences in 
role expectations, business customs, and levels of vertical coordination 
that are associated with alternative channel arrangements. The following 
is suggestive of issue categories that may be observed, and is not 
intended to be exhaustive. 
Consider differences in role expectations and business customs. 
Conventional channel members are likely to insist upon retaining those 
activities and decisions that strengthens or maintains their autonomous 
position, such as record keeping, inventory maintenance, and local and 
in-store promotion. Since these issues involve store operations and 
extend beyond the traditional role of a supplier, a greater degree of 
conflict over them is likely to be observed among conventional members 
when interference is perceived. The opposite would be true in a 
contractual channel, where a supplier's involvement with direct manage-
ment assistance is expected by franchisees (Etgar 1978). 
Variations in the levels of channel coordination may contribute to 
interchannel differences in conflict. Lacking a well-defined locus of 
control within a conventional channel (Etgar 1976), members may be 
unable to effectively coordinate promotional activities. Promotional 
efforts initiated by suppliers may represent a source of frustration 
for retailers since they may encourage brand switching rather than 
increasing retail sales. Alternatively, retailer-initiated promotions 
may be viewed by suppliers as damaging the brand franchise that they 
have developed. Consequently, hastily devised and uncoordinated promo-
tional programs may serve as a source of conflict among conventional 
channel members. The opposite should be true in a contractual channel, 
given the existence of a more well-defined locus of control. 
Higher levels of channel coordination, such as that found in 
franchise systems, may exact a price in the form of greater conflict 
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over product assortment. For the sake of economies in production and 
distribution, product assortment may be restricted. Product concentration 
enables more economical production runs, use of uniform packaging, and 
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standardization of handling procedures in distribution (Etgar 1976). 
Since franchises are in competition with other channel systems (e.g., 
conventional retailers) that have access to a larger number of suppliers, 
greater conflict may result from the inadequacy of the product line in 
a contractual arrangement. 
Based on the above reasoning, this research question may be stated 
in the form of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis li-B: Individual policies (issues) will fall into sets 
of conflict issues tha't reflect the same under-
lying construct (conflict type), such that they 
contribute differently to conflict across channel 
types. 
Response Behavior and Channel Structure 
Response to a conflict situation will vary with the nature of 
channel arrangement. Channel structure can be viewed as a surrogate 
measure of the power-dependency relationship. This should affect the 
nature of response. As discussed in the literature review, this may 
involve cooperative or competitive bargaining behavior or acquiescence. 
The type of channel arrangement may determine the nature of the 
dependency relationship. For instance, a franchise arrangement is likely 
to involve an asymmetrical power relationship in which a subordinate 
member is dependent upon a more dominant firm. This dependency will 
influence the dominant sentiments and response behavior that characterize 
channel interaction. Cooperative bargaining behavior is likely to vary 
directly with the level of dependency, while competitive bargaining 
behavior varies inversely (Roering 1977). 
Members of vertical marketing systems (e.g., contractural) do differ 
from their conventional counterparts in exhibiting more cooperative 
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sentiments (Stern and Reve 1980) and a more integrative planning mode of 
behavior (Wiek 1971). The structural nature of the arrangement may 
account for this. Franchisees, being contractually bound, may have 
fewer alternative sources of supply than conventional members. Since 
dependency varies inversely with the availability of alternative supply 
sources, a franchise dealer would be expected to behave more coopera-
tively. Alternatively, conventional members will have a greater number 
of alternative sources and are expected to behave more competitively 
and yield less to channel pressures. Based on this rationale, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis III: Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will 
differ by type of channel structure. Channel 
members in conventional channel arrangements will 
tend to exhibit less acquiescence, less coopera-
tive behavior, and greater competitive behavior 
relative to members of alternative structures. 
Response Behavior and Perceived Dependency 
Perception of the dependency relationship may direct a firm's 
response to conflict (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 1974). Although percep-
tions are associated with channel structure, within and over channels, 
individual perception will differ based on channel member characteristics. 
The level of cooperative behavior should vary directly with the 
level of perceived dependency, with the level of competitive behavior 
varying inversely. Furthermore, the specific nature of a dealer's 
response should be influenced by the degree to which the dealer perceives 
itself to be dependent upon the supplier, as well as by the degree to 
which the supplier is perceived by the dealer to be dependent upon it 
for valued resources. Formally, this research question may be stated 
as: 
Hypothesis IV: Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will 
differ according to the perceived channel power-
dependency relationship. 
Since perception of self and other firm dependency may interact at 
different levels to affect response, these hypothesized conditions are 
stated separately. 
When the dealer perceives itself to be more dependent upon the 
channel arrangement than the supplier, a subordinate asymmetrical 
relationship is assumed. Based on arguments presented in the previous 
chapter, a subordinate dealer will tend to enact a greater number of 
responses that are consistent with the desires of the more dominant 
supplier. This perceived condition may be stated in the form of the 
following research hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis IV-A: A retailer's acquiescence to a supplier's wishes 
should be associated with a high level of 
perceived dependency upon the supplier and a low 
level of supplier's dependency upon the retailer. 
When the dealer perceives itself to be less dependent upon the 
channel arrangement than the supplier, a dominant asymmetrical relation-
ship is assumed. A dominant dealer's response is likely to involve a 
greater number of demanding-threatening actions and relatively less 
cooperative behavior. Formally, this may be stated as: 
Hypothesis IV-B: A retailer's use of competitive behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with 
a low level of perceived dependency upon the 
supplier and a high level of supplier's 
dependency upon the retailer. 
When both parties are perceived by the dealer as being highly 
dependent upon each other, ac;symmetrically high dependency relationship 
is assumed. Response behavior is likely to be cooperative, rather than 
demanding or threatening. Commitment to and stake in the channel may 
serve to generate more cooperation and restrain the use of more 
coercive means of influence. This research question may be formally 
stated as: 
Hypothesis IV-C: A retailer's use of cooperative behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with 
a high level of perceived dependency upon the 
supplier and a high level of supplier's 
dependency upon the retailer. 
When neither party is perceived by the dealer as being highly 
dependent upon the other, a symmetrically low dependency relationship 
is assumed. Initial response is likely to be more competitive and less 
cooperative. However, the level of competitive behavior may not be as 
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demanding or threatening as that which typifies the dominant, asymmetrical 
relationship (H IV-B). This may be explained by a dealer's low channel 
commitment and low perceived ability to successfully exercise power. 
This research question may be stated in the form of the following 
research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis IV-D: A retailer's use of competitive behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with a 
low level of perceived dependency upon the 
supplier and a low level of supplier's dependency 
upon the retailer. The level of competitive 
behavior exhibited should be less compared to 
that observed under conditions in H IV-B. 
Data Collection 
The data collection procedure is the subject of this section. 
Attention is given to the population definition, sampling method, sample 
size, and the nature of the survey instrument. 
Definition of Channel Types 
Of interest in this research are dealers that are representative of 
alternative channel types. However, observed vertical arrangements do 
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not neatly fit the textbook definitions of the channel types previously 
mentioned (i.e., conventional, administered, and contractual channels). 
Examples of administered systems, that are often found in the literature 
and defined as not involving a formal agreement, may actually employ 
formal contractual arrangements depending upon the strength of the 
manufacturer. In addition, confusion often exists as to which channel 
arrangements should be included as franchise systems (Stern and 
El-Ansary 1977). For our purposes, the alternative channel arrangements 
are defined below in terms of relevant characteristics that are more 
readily identified. 
Business Format Franchise. A franchise system involves the 
licensing of an entire business format (store operation) (Stern and 
El-Ansary 1977). The franchisor (manufacturer or wholesaler) grants 
tangible or intangible assets (e.g., service, trademarks, expertise) 
under a long term contract to a number of independent retailers, in 
return for payment of fees and/or sales of the franchisor's products. 
This type of channel arrangement will be referred to as a chain or 
business format franchise. Based on ~tern and El-Ansary's definition 
(1970, p. 406), this arrangement is formally defined as: 
Business Format Franchise: Involves the licensing of an entire 
business format (store operation) where 
a number of independent retailers 
(franchisees) market a product or 
service and engage in a business 
developed by a firm (franchisor) using 
the latter's trade names, expertise, 
and business practices. 
Exclusive Dealing, Franchising Agreement. A franchising agreement 
involves a formal or implied contractual arrangement between independent 
parties, where a reseller is granted the right to market a supplier's 
brand (Stern and El-Ansary 1977). Unlike a franchise system, this 
agreement is concerned only with the merchandising of a particular 
product line, and not with the entire store operation (McCammon 1965). 
The supplier may agree to sell to only one retailer within the 
latter's territory, in which case the arrangement is referred to as 
exclusive franchising. A retailer's reciprocal agreement not to sell 
competitive lines that may dilute sales effort is referred to as 
exclusive dealing (Thompson 1971). In this investigation, the focus 
will be on exclusive dealing, which is formally defined as: 
Exclusive Dealing: Involves a formal or implied contractual 
arrangement between independent parties, that 
narrowly focuses upon the merchandising of a 
specific line of products, where a reseller is 
granted the right to market a supplier's brand 
and the reseller reciprocally agrees not to 
handle competitive products within that line. 
Conventional Channel. A conventional channel involves an exchange 
relationship between independent parties. Compared to alternative 
vertical arrangements little centralized coordination exists. Minimal 
coordination is achieved through the market mechanism. That is, the 
terms of exchange (e.g., products handled, level of promotion, level of 
assistance) are determined by their interaction as independent buyers 
and sellers in an intermediary market (Etgar 1976). 
Unlike exclusive dealing arrangements, retailers merchandise 
competitive lines. They may very well view themselves as purchasing 
agents for their customers rather than as selling agents for manu-
facturers, with product assortment being assembled from a wide number 
of suppliers. Therefore, product variety is expected to be richer in 
conventional channels than in more highly coordinated channel arrange-
ments (Etgar 1976). This type of channel arrangement will be defined 
in terms of multiple brand dealers and is formally defined below as: 
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Conventional Channel: Involves a relationship between independent 
parties, in which channel coordination is 
determined by the market exchange of products, 
where resellers handle a product assortment 
that is assembled from more than one supplier. 
Population Definition 
Sampling will focus on single unit retailers that are involved in 
the marketing of video and audio home electronic products. The popula-
tion was selected with respect to (1) the availability of alternative 
channel types, (2) the incidence of shorter, more direct channel arrange-
ments in which the franchisor or manufacturer served as the immediate 
supplier, and (3) an established industry in which dealerships of 
various ages existed. 
Since conflict may be directly related to the age of operation and 
channel relationship (Rosenberg and Stern 1971), possible bias may be 
minimized by considering an industry in which there is a variation as 
to operational experience. Furthermore, since channel length (i.e., 
number of intermediaries) may vary within and across channel types, 
bias may be reduced by focusing attention upon shorter, more direct 
channel arrangements. 
The population of interest will be limited to dealers located in 
SMSA's in the states of Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, 
Indiana, and Ohio. The population definition has been concentrated 
geographically to minimize variation in economic conditions, since the 
perception of conflict may be affected by environmental conditions 
(Rosenberg 1971; Cadotte and Stern 1979). The yellow pages directory 
for each area considered will serve as the sampling frame. 
Sampling Method 
The absence of an adequate sampling frame, that is capable of 
identifying uniquely each unit (retailer) by channel type, places 
limitations upon the sampling process. To overcome this problem, 
identification of relevant units will be achieved by the development 
of controls that are representative of the characteristics of interest. 
47 
The sample will be classified into homogeneous groups (channel types) 
by the use of the following controls. Tradenames, by which franchise 
operations can be identified locally, will be determined by employing 
specialized research directories (e.g., Franchise Opportunities Handbook). 
Depending upon the number of brands (one versus several) that dealers 
sell within the home electronic category, non-franchise operations may 
respectively be classified as exclusive and multiple brand dealerships. 
Employing these controls, dealers belonging to alternative channel types 
may be identified within each SMSA by using the yellow pages directory. 
Within exclusive and multiple brand dealer groups, subjects will be 
selected in a systematic random manner. Due to the low number of 
franchise operations, a complete enumeration of franchises may be 
required to achieve equivalent numbers of responses across channel 
groups. 
Sample Size 
The sample size employed in channel research has varied widely; 
with a number of studies being limited to small samples of 100 or more 
because of cost considerations (Rosson and Sweitzer 1979). The sample 
should be large enough so that when it is divided into major groups 
(i.e., retailers in alternative vertical channel arrangements) each 
group has a sufficient sample size. For a regional study of firms, 
involving a comparison among a few major groups, a typical sample size 
might range from 50 to 200 (Sudman 1976, p. 87). 
The size of this sample should be sufficient to allow for non-
response. A brief review of the channel literature reveals a response 
rate for mail surveys that ranges from a high of 47 percent (Lusch 
1976a, b) to a low of 16 percent (Michie 1978); with medium response 
levels of 26 percent (Hunt and Nevin 1974) and 21 percent (Brown 1978). 
A small sample size may be justified when the sample is stratified 
and represents a large proportion of the defined population. Since 
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the sample will be stratified by type of channel arrangement, variability 
of within group response should be minimized by the more homogeneous 
nature of therespondents, thereby, reducing the size of the sample 
needed. Limited empirical evidence would seem to support the likelihood 
of perceptual and behavioral responses that are homogenous within, but 
heterogeneous among alternative channel types (lleik 1971). 
Since equivalent numbers of responses are desired for each channel 
category in the analysis, the availability of franchise operations will 
serve as the controlling factor in determining sample size. Given the 
above considerations, a sample size of 300 retailers that is equally 
divided among channel types should be adequate. 
Survey Instrument 
A self-administered mail questionnaire will be employed to gather 
the data. The survey instrument is designed to obtain perceptual 
measures on a number of issues salient to the retailer-supplier relation-
ship. Classification information will also be collected, such as the 
size of retail operations, number of years in operation, and number of 
years that a particular channel relationship has existed. Screening 
questions will also be used to confirm whether the dealers selected 
were members of a particular channel type. 
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Contact will involve an initial mailing and two follow-ups. Since 
anonymity will be guaranteed, all subjects in the sample will be mailed 
a follow-up questionnaire. Due to cost considerations, the second 
follow-up will be limited to channel groups with the previously lower 
response rates. Approximately 40 days will be allowed for responses. 
Since cooperation of franchise operations is crucial, letters explaining 
the study will be sent to franchisors. The questionnaire and cover 
letters are presented in the Appendix. 
Measurement 
The nature of the concepts employed and their operational defini-
tions are considered below. Attention will be focused upon the 
examination and measurement of conflict, response behavior and 
dependency. 
Conflict 
The empirical nature of conflict is examined in this section. In 
the measurement of channel conflict, most researchers have employed a 
somewhat similar procedure (Brown 1977). First, issues over which 
conflict might occur were identified. Second, subjects were asked to 
make an estimate of the degree of conflict in a statement or issue 
(Rosenberg and Stern 1971; Pearson 1971), or estimate the frequency of 
disagreement over an issue (Lusch 1974a, b). Finally, some form of 
index was obtained by summing or averaging the response over the issues 
previously identified. A similar procedure will be employed here. 
Conflict Issues. In the development of a measure, salient issues 
that are representative of conflict in a cross-channel setting must 
first be specified. Initial attention might be given to Rosenberg's 
(1974) exploratory, cross-channel study of conflict, in which a number 
of general issues were identified. A review of trade publications, as 
well as preliminary discussions with dealers should also serve as 
sources of relevant issues. 
Typical conflict issues might involve the nature of assistances 
and the level of services that are provided by a supplier. These and 
other issues are presented in section two of the questionnaire in 
Appendix A. 
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Conflict Components. Within a survey of channel conflict, manifest 
conflict may be best operationalized in terms of the disagreements that 
occur among channel members (Brown and Day 1981). Various components 
have been employed in the measurement of this construct, including the 
frequency and intensity of disagreements and issue importance. 
Lusch (1976a, b) formed a composite measure by summing the ratings 
of recalled frequency of disagreements over a representative set of 
channel issues. However, a richer construct containing more information 
about the interaction process might be obtained by including other 
dimensions. 
In an attempt to improve upon the previous construct, channel 
researchers have considered the perceived relative importance of the 
conflict issues involved and the intensity of disagreements over these 
issues. Conceptually, issue importance was considered to be more 
closely associated with perceived conflict, while intensity was regarded 
more as a property of manifest conflict (Brown 1978). 
Within a recent evaluation of atlernative measures of manifest 
conflict (Brown and Day 1981), several measures which combined these 
dimensions were found to perform well with respect to reliability and 
validity. The superior measure combined frequency, intensity, and 
importance. A second measure, which also performed well, included only 
the frequency and intensity of disagreements. Both measures combined 
the dimensions in a multiplicative manner. 
Operational Definition. Because of its more parsimonious nature 
and its conceptual consistency with the phenomenon being measured, 
manifest conflict will be operationally defined in terms of the 
frequency and intensity of disagreements. These dimensions will be 
combined in a multiplicative manner for each issue. 
In the testing of hypotheses, both single-item and multi-item 
measures will be employed. A multi-item index of conflict will be 
formed by summing the combined dimensions over the relevant issues. 
Mathematically, this may be expressed as: 
where C .. 
l.J 
F. "k l.J 
I. "k l.J 
the overall index of conflict between retailer i and 
supplier j, 
the frequency of disagreement between retailer i and 
supplier j over issue k, and 
the intensity of typical disagreements between retailer i 
and supplier j over issue k. 
The dimensions will be measured by asking respondents to recall 
issues over which they had disagreements with their supplier during 
the past year. Employing an 11-point (0-100 percent) scale, retailers 
will be requested to estimate the percentage of their discussions 
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regarding an issue in which disagreements were expressed. The intensity 
of disagreements experienced on each issue will then be rated on a 
seven-point (low-high) scale. Examples of the measurement scales are 
presented in sections two and three of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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In constructing scales, one must always consider the relevant 
number of response categories to employ. Tull and Albaum (1973, p. 118) 
suggest that " too few categories leads to loss of much of the 
respondents' powers of discrimination, while too many may go beyond the 
respondents' ability to discriminate." The 11-point scale, expressed 
in percentages, would appear to be easy to understand and use even 
though a somewhat large number of categories is provided. The seven-
point scale complies with research tradition in the field. 
The proposed measure is consistent with previous recommendations 
(Lusch 1976b) and studies that have explored the nature of channel 
conflict (Brown 1978, 1979). Although these studies have dealt with a 
franchise channel, the measure employed may be applicable to a variety 
of channel settings (Brown and Day 1981). Given the predominant 
sentiments and role expectations held by members of alternative channel 
arrangements, it is likely that both the frequency and intensity of 
disagreements will vary across channel types. Information concerning 
this interaction process is more likely to be captured by the measure 
suggested. 
Response Behavior 
Channel members may respond to conflict in a number of ways in an 
attempt to initially resolve disagreements. Dealers may attempt to 
cooperate, in the hope of finding a mutually satisfactory solution 
(cooperative bargaining behavior). They may overtly seek their own 
self-interest through the use of persuasion or force (competitive 
bargaining behavior). Or, they may modify their own behavior by 
unilaterally accommodating the wishes of the supplier (acquiescence). 
The operationalization of these alternative forms of response behavior 
is the focus of this section. 
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The development of multi-item measures was accomplished by drawing 
upon the relevant channel (e.g., Angelmar and Stern 1978) and bargaining 
literature (e.g., Walton and McKersie 1965). Partial inspiration was 
obtained from a multi-item scale that was developed under conditions 
of lateral intergroup conflict, in which conflict was simulated 
between corporate divisions (Ackelsberg and Yuki 1979). Since 
interorganizational channel conflict was considered to be a special case 
of this form of conflict (Pruden 1969), and since an attempt had been 
made to validate the construct, the scale was considered to be suggestive 
of the type of response items that might be included here. 
Domain of Conflict. In the development of a multi-item scale, the 
domain of the construct must first be considered. That is, the concept 
must be delineated in terms of the specific actions that are consistent 
with the definition of the construct. 
Recall from the previous chapter that conflict responses may be 
conceptualized in terms of bargaining behavior. In fact, bargaining 
may be viewed as a behavioral response to conflict that is found in 
channel relations regardless of channel type (Angelmar and Stern 1978). 
In consists of two subprocesses, involving competitive and cooperative 
response modes (Pondy 1967; Stern 1971). 
Competitive bargaining behavior tends to be individualistic in 
nature, focusing upon the satisfaction only of one's own interests. 
Manipulation of the other party's behavior and attitudes is attempted 
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through the use of persuasion, threats, commitments, or commands 
(Angelmar and- Stern 1978). Appeals to third parties may also be employed 
(Pondy 1967). Alternatively, cooperative bargaining exhibits an inte-
grative problem solving approach. Communication tends to be open, with 
a focus upon an exploration of possible options that are mutually 
beneficial (Pruitt and Lewis 1975). 
Separate from bargaining is acquiescence, which involves unilateral 
accommodation. Since bilateral accommodation is a necessary condition 
for bargaining (Chertkoff and Esser 1976), acquiescence must be 
considered as a distinct response form. 
Operational Definition. Based on the above considerations, measure-
ment of the alternative modes of response behavior should incorporate 
the following properties. Cooperative behavior should reflect (1) a 
joint problem solving approach, (2) flexibility in achieving an equitable 
solution, (3) efforts to better understand the other's viewpoint, and 
(4) attempts to smooth over differences and emphasize common interests. 
The measurement of competitive behavior should reflect attempts to 
modify the behavior of others through the use of (1) coercion, 
(2) persuasion, and (3) appeals to third parties. Measurement of 
acquiescence should reflect (1) the modification of intrafirm behavior, 
(2) the avoidance of arguments, ·and (3) accommodation without the 
expectation of a concession being given in return. 
Item statements will be developed for each of the above response 
categories. Respondents will be asked to indicate the frequency with 
which a particular response was made during the previous year. This 
will be achieved by using a seven-point scale with end points of 
"very frequently" and "very infrequently". Responses will then be 
summed over the items that reflect each category to form separate 
indexes of each type of conflict response. The item-statements and 
scale are presented in section four of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
Dependency 
• 
Dependency is a property of the relationship that exists among 
channel members. It reflects a channel member's commitment to and 
stake in a given business relationship. Alternatively, it has been 
considered as an index of power that reflects a channel member's 
capacity to be influenced by another (El-Ansary 1975). 
Conceptual (El-Ansary 1971) and empirical studies (El-Ansary and 
Stern 1972; El-Ansary 1975) contributed to the measurement of this 
concept. The concept and its operational definitionare considered 
below. 
The Concept. An understanding of the concept is necessary to the 
development of a multi-item construct. Based on the work of Emerson 
(1962), El-Ansary (1971) developed a conceptual model of the power-
dependency relationship within a channel setting. This model has 
provided insight into the measurement of dependency (El-Ansary and 
Stern 1972). 
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Channel members were viewed as attempting to satisfy economic goals 
(i.e., net profits). Through the offering or withholding of valued 
resources, a channel member was able to affect another's achievement 
of its goals. For instance, a supplier's offering of a high service 
level, such as prompt delivery, may contribute to a retailer's gross 
margin return on investment by decreasing the average investment in 
retail inventory required. The greater the value of these resources, 
the greater would be the retailer's commitment to a supplier. 
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This commitment, defined in terms of the importance of the resources 
offered, was a necessary, but insufficient condition for dependency. 
Since other sources of supply might offer resources of a similar value, 
the level of a retailer's dependency would vary inversely with the 
number of feasible alternative suppliers. That is, a retailer may be 
committed to dealing with suppliers that offer certain resources, but-
exhibit a low level of dependence because any one of a number offer 
similar resources. Further, since replacement of a channel member 
might not be without its costs, dependency would vary directly with 
the difficulty in effort and cost that was associated with an attempt 
to replace a supplier with another. .. 
Operational Definition. A multi-item measure of dependency will 
be employed. Based upon the suggestion that a perceptual, rather than 
an objective measure may be more appropriate (Firat, Tybout, and Stern 
1974), a seven-point, summated Likert scale will be employed. Items 
within the scale will reflect the determinants that were suggested in 
the above conceptual and empirical studies, including: (1) size of 
business transacted with another channel member, (2) importance of a 
channel arrangement in contributing to a channel member's profitability, 
(3) difficulty and cost of replacing the present arrangement, and 
(4) the importance of a particular marketing mix program offered by 
another. 
Consistent with previous studies (El-Ansary and Stern 1972; 
El-Ansary 1975), separate indexes will be formed to measure the self-
perceived and attributed level of dependency. That is, retailers will 
be asked to indicate their level of perceived dependency upon a 
supplier and the supplier's level of dependency upon the retailer, 
as perceived by the retail manager/owner. These measures are presented 
in section one of the questionnaire in the Appendix A. 
Plan of Analysis 
A presentation of the proposed plan of analysis is the objective 
of this section. A number of univariate and multivariate procedures 
will be employed to examine the hypotheses presented earlier in the 
chapter. Given the exploratory nature of the study, the null 
hypothesis will be rejected at a level of significance of .10 and 
beyond. 
Hypothesis I 
The magnitude of channel conflict may be expected to vary across 
channel types. To test this hypothesis, retailers will be asked to 
indicate the frequency and intensity of recalled disagreements with a 
supplier over a given issue. These dimensions will be combined in a 
multiplicative manner for each issue and summed over all issues. This 
index will then be employed as the dependent variable in a one-way 
analysis of variance procedure over channel types. 
Hypothesis II 
Channel policies are likely to contributedifferently to conflict 
across channel types. The hypothesis will be examined in two parts. 
Hypothesis II-A. Part A considers the role that individual issues 
play in contributing to conflict across channel types. As before, 
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respondents will be asked to indicate the frequency and intensity of 
recalled disagreements. These dimensions will then be combined 
multiplicatively to obtain a specific measure of conflict for each 
issue. 
These single-item conflict measures will be employed as dependent 
variables in a one-way MANOVA procedure over channel types. This will 
be used to test if the three channel types are significantly different 
with respect to the separate conflict issues considered simultaneously. 
Hypothesis II-B. The set of separate issues may be more 
parsimoniously summarized into a smaller set of issue types that 
contribute differently to conflict across channel types. A multi-step 
procedure will be used to test part B of the hypothesis. 
First, a principal components procedure will be employed to 
examine the underlying components of the total set of conflict issues 
(F * I 's) Consistent with traditional research procedure, the ijk ijk • 
number of factors retained will be based on the following ~riteria: 
(1) eigenvalues equal to or greater than one, (2) use of the scree 
test, and (3) interpretability of the factors (Hair 1979). A varimax 
rotation will be used to aid in the interpretation of the factors. 
Only those issues that have a loading of .50 or better will be 
considered for inclusion in respective factors. 
For each factor retained, separate indices will be constructed 
that reflect the differing types of conflict issues. The multi-item 
measure will be obtained by adding the original item conflict values 
(Fijk * Iijk's) for each of the variables (issues) that load at .50 
or better on a given factor, and dividing that sum by tpe relevant 
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number of variables. This final step will be taken to allow for 
differential factor sizes regarding the number of issues included. 
These newly created indices will then be introduced as dependent 
variables in a one-way MANOVA. This procedure will be used to test if 
the three channel types are significantly different with respect to 
the issue types considered simultaneously. 
Hypothesis III 
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Treating channel structure as a surrogate measure of the dependency 
relationship, Hypothesis III will examine the differences in conflict 
response that may be attributed to alternative channel types. To test 
this assumption, dealers will be asked to indicate how frequently they 
have employed various methods initially to handle disagreements with 
their supplier during the past year. The frequency with which a given 
response was employed will be indicated on a seven-point scale with end 
points of "very frequently" and "very infrequently". Response items 
will be summed over the issues associated with acquiescence, cooperative 
and competitive behavior respectively to obtain three separate multi-
item measures of response modes. As an internal check, factor analysis 
will be performed to confirm the internal consistency and validity of 
the measures. 
The three response mode measures will be introduced as dependent 
variables in a one-way MANOVA. This procedure will be employed to 
test if the three channel types are significantly different with 
respect to the mean response exhibited on each of the three constructs 
considered simultaneously. 
Hypothesis IV 
To determine if dealer response to conflict differs according to 
perceived dependency, a factorial arrangement will be employed in the 
context of a completely randomized design. A multi-step procedure will 
be involved in the examination of this hypothesis. 
Dealers will be asked to indicate their level of perceived 
dependency upon a supplier (self dependency) and the supplier's 
dependency upon the dealer, as perceived by the dealer (supplier 
dependency). Separate multi-item indexes will be formed to measure 
self and supplier dependency, using the measurement instrument 
previously discussed in this chapter. 
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These measures will be employed as independent variables in a 2x2 
factorial arrangement: Self-perceived dependency (low-high) x Supplier 
dependency (low-high). Respondents will be divided into two groups, 
using the median response to the first variable (self dependency). Both 
of these groups will then be further divided by using the median response 
to the second variable (supplier dependency). 
The factorial arrangement will enable one to evaluate both the main 
and interaction effects of the two independent variables upon a dependent 
variable (conflict response). Since multiple responses are involved, 
a one-way MANOVA will be employed to examine the effect of dependency 
on the three response modes considered simultaneously. 
Summary 
A discussion of the proposed research design was the objective of 
this chapter. Based upon a review of the channel literature, a number 
of research questions regarding channel conflict were considered and 
were presented as formal hypotheses to be tested. The nature of the 
sampling procedure and survey instrument were then considered. This 
was followed by a discussion of the theoretical concepts and their 
operational definitions. The plan of analysis was then provided. 






A presentation of the research findings is the focus of this 
chapter. The nature of the data and collection procedures are initially 
considered. This is followed by a discussion of the findings. 
Attention is given to two groups of hypotheses dealing with (1) the 




A sample of video and audio electronic retailers was selected from 
the Yellow Pages Directory for selected SMSA's located in Illinois, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Indiana, and Ohio. The sample 
was stratified by alternative business arrangements. Since equivalent 
numbers of responses were desired for each channel type in the analysis, 
the availability of franchise operations served as the controlling 
factor in determining sample size. SMSA's sampled were limited to those 
in which all three channel types were represented. 
During the Spring of 1982 a mail questionnaire was sent to 350 
single unit retailers. Due to frame error (i.e., incorrect addresses, 
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firms out of business, firms not independently owned), the operational 
sample was reduced to 318. Of this, 83 dealers or 26 percent responded. 
Included were 20 franchise operations, 23 exclusive dealerships, and 
40 multiple brand dealers. Because of omission of questionnaire items, 
the usable response was reduced to 24.5 percent. This response rate 
is comparable to the typical response rates obtained in survey research 
involving channel studies. 
Collection Procedure 
The survey instrument included two versions: one tailored to 
franchise and the other to non-franchise operations. The versions 
differed only with respect to the screening question and several 
classification items. In the main body of the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to indicate (1) the frequency and intensity of recalled 
disagreements expressed over a given issue with an adjacent supplier, 
(2) the frequency with which alternative responses to conflict were 
made, (3) their perceived level of dependency upon the supplier, 
(4) the supplier's level of dependency upon the retailer as perceived 
by the retailer, and (5) various overall feelings of conflict, tensions, 
and satisfaction regarding the channel relationship in general. 
An initial mailing and two follow-ups were sent to dealers during 
the months of May and June at approximately two week intervals. The 
final mailing (200) was limited to the groups having the previously 
lower response rates (i.e., franchisees and exclusive dealerships). 
Since cooperation of franchise operations was crucial, letters explaining 
the study were mailed to the franchisors. The three mailings 
respectively accounted for 58 percent, 36 percent, and 6 percent of 
the response. 
Characteristics of Respondents 
A summary of respondent characteristics is provided in Table I. 
It indicates a diversity with respect to store size, age of operation, 
and length of relationship with the supplier. 
Represented in the sample were small, medium, and large-sized 
operations, that ranged from 600 to 80,000 square feet and averaged 
8,000 square feet. Both new and well-established firms were present, 
with variations from 1 to 75 years in business and an average of 22 
years. Length of the relationship with the supplier ranged from 1 to 
45 years, with an average relationship of 14 years. 
Wide variability in respondent characteristics among channel types 
raised the question of the effect of these extraneous variables upon 
the dependent variables. This issue was addressed by correlating store 
size, age of operation, and length of channel relationship with each of 
the dependent variables employed in later hypotheses. No significant 
relationship was observed at the .10 level. 
Nature of Channel Conflict 
64 
The nature of conflict in the home electronic industry was the 
subject of the first group of hypotheses. Of interest was the magnitude 
of conflict that was experienced by retailers across channel types and 
the types of issues that contributed to this conflict. 
Measurement 
Conflict was measured as a form of opponent-centered opposition 
that is manifested in the form of verbal or written exchanges of 
disagreements between parties. The construct was operationalized as a 
Variable 
Store Size (Sq. Ft.) 
Average 
Range 
Years in Operation 
Average 
Range 




CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
Franchise a 
2,335 
600 - 5,600 
9.2 
1 - 32 
10.3 




1 '500 - 40' 110 
22.3 
2 - 75 
14.2 




1,000 - 80,000 
29.9 
6 - 70 
16.8 
2 - 35 
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aFranchise operations included Team Electronics, Radio Shack, Video 
Connection, Video Movie Center, and Video Station. 
bExclusive dealerships dealt with manufacturers, including 
Magnavox, General Electric, and Curtis Mathis. 
cMultiple brand dealers dealt with both manufacturers and whole-
salers. In terms of the brand identified and referred to in the 
questionnaire, these firms dealt primarily with the manufacturer. 
composite of the frequency and intensity of recalled disagreements with 
a particular supplier concerning a given policy (issue). The manner in 
which a store operates or the amount and type of inventory a dealer is 
expected to carry illustrate typical issues over which disagreements 
might occur. 
The following measurement procedure was employed, based on the 
discussion presented in the previous chapter. Respondents were asked 
to recall interactions with their suppliers concerning issues over 
which disagreements had occurred during the past 12 months. Retailers 
were then requested to indicate the frequency and intensity of these 
disagreements. These dimensions were combined in a multiplicative 
manner for each issue. Mathematically, conflict on each issue was 
expressed as: 
where cijk 
F. "k l.J 
I. "k l.J 
F. "k *I. "k l.J l.J 
conflict between retailer i and supplier j on a given 
issue k, 
the frequency of disagreement between retailer i and 
supplier j over issue k, and . 
= the intensity of typical disagreements between retailer i 
and supplier j over issue k. 
In total, 19 issues were considered. As a preliminary check upon 
the ability of each issue to explain conflict in the channel relation-
ship, each issue was correlated with a single item measure of overall 
conflict. The latter was measured on a seven-point scale, having end 
points of "no conflict at all" and "constant conflict". All 19 issues 
were significantly related to the univariate measure of conflict 
(p < .10), with 17 issues significant at the .05 level and beyond. 
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The level of conflict experienced by all dealers on each of the 
19 issues is presented in Table II. Supplier's price was the major 
source of conflict. This reflected a concern among all dealers as to 
the adequacy of retail profit margins. Also indicating a high level of 
conflict was promotional-related issues (adequacy of promotional 
allowances and supplier's advertising) and the supplier's policy 
regarding unsold merchandise (return policy). Alternatively, the 
manner in which the store was operated (store operations) and the 
supplier's replacement and repair of defective merchandise (warranty 
policy) accounted for the lowest level of conflict for the industry. 
Aggregate Conflict Across Channels 
\Vhen dealers are classified as to the nature of their channel 
arrangement, aggregate conflict may be expected to vary across channel 
types. Opportunistic tendencies that contribute to conflict in 
conventional channels may be mitigated by contractually derived 
coordination of activities and the establishment of shared goals among 
vertically integrated channel members. Based on this rationale, it was 
anticipated in Hypothesis I that a higher level of conflict would be 
experienced by conventional channel members. In alternative form, the 
hypothesis is stated below: 
Hypothesis I: The magnitude of intrachannel conflict perceived by 
retailers will differ by type of channel structure. 
Channel members in conventional channel arrangements 
will tend to perceive a high level of conflict 
relative to members of alternative structures. 
To test the hypothesis, conflict was operationalized as a multi-
item index. That is, the previously mentioned dimensions for each 
issue were summed over all 19 issues. Mathematically, this procedure 
was expressed as: 
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TABLE II 
LEVEL OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCEDa ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES BY ALL DEALERS 





Supplier's Price 23.6 22.7 
Promotional Allowances 17.8 19.7 
Return Policy 17.5 21.6 
Supplier Advertising 17.2 18.5 
Sales Training Assistances 16.4 19.1 
Sales Promotion 14.7 17.4 
Billing Errors 14.5 19.1 
Inventory Financing 14.2 20.3 
Store Management Assistances 12.9 16.1 
Promptness of Delivery 12.8 12.1 
Product Assortment 12.7 ll.8 
New Products 12.6 14.0 
Inventory Requirements 12.5 14.7 
Terms of Sale 12.1 13.8 
Retail Ad Flexibility 12.1 14.9 
Rebate Programs 11.9 16.5 
Complete Product Line 11.0 13.2 
Warranty Policy 8.0 10.0 
Store Operations 5.6 7.6 
aPossible levels of conflict ranged from a minimum of zero to a 






















where C .. 
1] 
19 
L: F. "k * I. "k 
k=l 1] 1] 
the overall index of conflict between retailer i and 
supplier j. 
As an internal check of the measure, tests of reliability and 
validity were conducted. The internal consistency of the conflict 
index was assessed by coefficient alpha, which for the 19 item scale 
was .90. Evidence of convergent validity was provided by correlating 
the multi-item construct with the previously mentioned univariate 
measure of overall conflict. The correlation between the two measures 
was statistically significant (r =.55, p = .0001). 
Further evidence of validity is provided to the extent that a 
construct operates in expected ways as suggested by an existing body 
of knowledge (Brown 1981). The multi-item index was found to be 
significantly related in the expected direction with a single item 
measure of tensions between channel members (r = .51, p = .0001) and 
satisfaction with the relationship (r = -.49, p. = 0001). 
The multi-item index was employed as the response variable in an 
analysis of the average levels of conflict over alternative channel 
types. The statistical results are presented in Table III. 
TABLE III 
DIFFERENCES IN AGGREGATE CONFLICT AMONG CHANNEL TYPES 
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Channel Types Mean ANOVA Results 
Exclusive Dealership 






p = .22 
1.53 
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As anticipated, franchise operations exhibited the lowest average 
level of conflict. However, exclusive dealerships, and not multiple 
brand dealers (i.e., conventional channel members), experienced the 
highest average level of conflict. Although channel types varied as to 
the average level of conflict recalled, the difference was not statis-
tically significant (p = .22) using the one-way analysis of variance. 
While the observed difference between exclusive dealerships and franchise 
operations appeared to be significant, a post hoc t-test indicated that 
it was not statistically significant. Given the outcomes observed, the 
directional nature of the latter half of the hypothesis was not 
examined. 
Conflict Issues 
Channel policies (issues) may differ in their ability to contribute 
to conflict across channel types. As a result, the composite index may 
conceal interchannel differences. Therefore, attention was given to 
individual issues. Hypothesis II-A is examined as follows: 
Hypothesis II-A: The magnitude of conflict that is experienced on 
individual policies (issues) will differ among 
channel types. 
A one-way MANOVA was employed to test if the three channel types 
were significantly different with respect to the average level of 
conflict experienced over individual issues. This procedure made it 
unnecessary to make a priori decisions regarding which conflict issues 
contributed most to interchannel differences. Furthermore, since 
multiple responses from the same respondent may be correlated, any 
correlation was accounted for by the simultaneous testing of all 
issues (Redinger 1977; Hair 1979). 
The statistical results are summarized in Table IV. A significant 
global difference between channel types was found. The F-statistic 
computed from Wilks' lambda was significant at the .086 level, with 
F(38,110) = 1.41. The strength of the effect was estimated by the 
generalized Eta squared (Redinger 1977). Fifty-five percent of the 
variation in the dependent variables (conflict issues) was accounted 
for by channel type. 
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Given a statistically significant difference among the three channel 
types, one would like to know which conflict issues contributed to the 
difference. A series of univariate F tests were run on each of the 
individual issues in order to ascertain prominent conflict issues. It 
should be noted that the univariate tests ignore possible correlations 
among the response variables and may result in a higher probability of 
a type I error than that which is stated (Redinger 1977). However, 
insights to the data are provided. Results of the univariate tests 
and the average level of conflict experienced on each issue across 
channel types are also presented in Table IV along with the multivariate 
results. 
Five prominent issues were identified as significant at the .10 
level and beyond. These included inventory requirements, promotional 
allowances, rebate programs, store operations, and retail ad flexibility. 
All five issues appear to impact upon the flexibility with which a 
dealership may be operated. Inventory requirements and store operations 
respectively deal with the amount and type of inventory that a dealer 
is expected to carry and the manner in which the store is expected to 
be operated. Ad flexibility and promotional allowances involve a store's 
ability to run specials unrestricted and the adequacy of financial 
TABLE IV 
DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE CONFLICT EXPERIENCED ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES BY CHANNEL TYPE 
Franchise 
Conflict Issue Operation 
Inventory Requirements 9.4 
Terms of Sale 10.8 
Rebate Programs 8.2 
Promptness of Delivery 16.7 
Product Assortment 14.4 
Store Management Assistances 13.6 
Sales Training Assistances 13.8 
Supplier's Price 15.7 
Return Policy 10.4 
Warranty Policy 7.9 
Sales Promotion 12.2 
Retail Ad Flexibility 7.1 
Promotional Allowances 8.7 
Supplier Advertising 11.2 
Store Operations 3.8 
Billing Errors 13.0 
Complete Product Line 12.6 
New Products 14.4 
Inventory Financing 16.8 
--
a p < • 01. 
b p < .05. 
c p < .10. 
Exclusive Multiple 











































Wilks' lambda .4519 
F(38,110) = 1.41 
p = .08 
2 Eta = .548 
-...! 
N 
support for local promotional effort. The fifth issue involved a 
store's required participation in supplier-initiated rebate programs. 
Post hoc analysis using Duncan's multiple range test indicated 
that exclusive dealerships differed significantly from their channel 
counterparts, exhibiting the highest average level of conflict on all 
five issues. This may be explained by a dealer's concern for its 
autonomy. Although highly dependent upon the channel relationship, 
these independent dealers may resent supplier interference with the 
operation of their stores. 
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Franchise operations experienced the lowest average level of 
conflict on four of the five issues. However, these dealers did not 
differ significantly from their conventional channel counterparts (i.e., 
multiple brand dealers). Several explanations for the observed low 
level of conflict may be offered. Given the availability of alternative 
sources of supply, multiple brand dealers may simply ignore a supplier's 
request. Alternatively, suppliers may refrain from such influence 
attempts in light of increased brand competition for the retailer's 
limited floor space. As for franchisees, they may expect and prefer a 
supplier's input because of the latter's expertise regarding store 
operations. 
Types of Conflict Issues 
Within the data, clusters of interrelated issues may be found 
that contribute differently to conflict across alternative channel 
arrangements. Based on this rationale, Hypothesis li-B is presented 
below in its alternative form: 
/'. ----
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Hypothesis II-B: Individual policies will fall into sets of 
conflict issues that reflect the same underlying 
construct (conflict type), such that they 
contribute differently to conflict across channel 
types. 
In the investigation of this hypothesis, a multi-step procedure 
was employed. First, the 19 issues were submitted to factor analysis 
to determine if they could be summarized into a smaller set of components, 
each reflecting the same underlying type of conflict. Second, based on 
this analysis, "specialized" indices were formed that reflected 
differing types of conflict. Third, a one-way MANOVA was employed to 
test if channel types differed significantly with respect to the newly 
created set of indices. 
Construct Identification. A principal components procedure was 
employed on the 19 conflict items (F .. k *I .. k's) over all respondents 
l.J l.J 
to examine the clusters of issues that interrelated with one another. 
Using the factor cutoff criteria of eigenvalues equal to or greater than 
one, four factors accounting for 66.7 percent of the variance were 
obtained. A fifth factor was suggested by the scree test; however, it 
was not retained because of its failure to enhance factor interpre-
tation. The factor loadings for the four factors are provided in 
Table V based on a varimax rotation. 
Factors in the analysis were interpretaed based on variables 
loading at .50 or better on each factor. Eighteen of the 19 variables 
fell within one of the four factors. The variables loading heavily on 
each factor and a subjective label assigned to each factor are given 
in Table VI. Respectively, the four factors reflect disagreements over 
(1) the level and appropriateness of promotional ~ssistances, (2) the 
TABLE V 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (Fijk * Iijk) ISSUES, PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS PROCEDURE WITH VARIMAX ROTATION 
Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV 
Conflict Issue Loadings Loadings Loadings Loadings 
Inventory Requirements .26 .16 -.20 .68 
Terms of Sale .29 .01 .12 .75 
Rebate Programs .59 -.04 .19 .30 
Promptness of Delivery -.07 .69 .24 .15 
Product Assortment .13 .OS .83 .11 
Store Management Assistances .44 .45 .24 .30 
Sales Training Assistances .82 .09 -.01 -.02 
Supplier's Price .74 .23 .32 .04 
Return Policy .73 .43 -.07 -.08 
Warranty Policy .26 .74 .25 -.04 
Sales Promotion .83 .10 .15 .15 
Retail Ad Flexibility .76 -.11 .26 .17 
Promotional Allowances .79 .08 .06 .30 
Supplier Advertising .74 .03 .22 .17 
Store Operations .02 .07 .24 .73 
Billing Errrors .06 .83 -.01 .07 
Complete Product Line .29 .16 .82 .04 
New Products .18 .30 .79 .07 
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Promotional Allowances 


























quality of service, (3) the adequacy of the product assortment, and 
(4) the supplier's expectations regarding operating policies. 
Utilizing the factor analysis results, four new indices (conflict 
categories) were calculated for each respondent. These were obtained by 
adding the individual conflict values (F .. k *I .. k's) for the variables 
l.J l.J 
that loaded highly on a given factor and dividing that sum by the number 
of these variables. The averaging step was taken to allow comparisons 
over factors with different numbers of loadings. Mathematically, the 








F. "k l.J c 
I. "k l.J c 
n 
c 
l: F. "k * I. "k k=l l.J c l.J c 
n 
c 
= the index of conflict between retailer i and supplier j 
over issue category c, 
= the number of issues that are associated with category c, 
= the frequency of disagreement between retailer i and 
supplier j over issue k that is associated with category c, 
and 
= the intensity of typical disagreements between retailer i 
and supplier j over issue k that is associated with 
category c. 
As an internal check on the validity of the factor indices, the 
indices were correlated with the single-item overall measure of conflict. 
The correlations between each index and overall conflict were statis-
tically significant at the .01 level and beyond, thereby providing 
evidence of convergent validity. As expected, the magnitude of 
correlations were low (.30 ~ r <.52). This reflects the diversity of 
the domain of conflict and the need for alternative dimensions to 
measure it. Further evidence of validity was found when the indices 
correlated positively with an item measure of tensions (.25 < r < .54, 
p < .03) and negatively with channel satisfaction (-.42 < r < -.23, 
p < • 04). 
Interchannel Differences. The newly created indices were intro-
duced as dependent variables in a MANOVA to test the null hypothesis 
of no difference over channel types as to conflict types. The 
multivariate and univariate statistical results are provided in Table 
VII. A significant global difference between channel types was found. 
The F-statistic computed from Wilks' lambda was significant at the 
.OS level, with F(8,140) = 2.00. 
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In a follow-up analysis, univariate F tests were employed to 
determine the cause of the global difference. Only one index, supplier's 
operating policy, was found to be significant (p = .0033). Duncan's 
multiple range test indicated that exclusive dealerships differed 
significantly from their channel counterparts by exhibiting the 
highest average level of conflict. Unlike the previous univariate 
analysis, this set of interrelated issues focused more narrowly on 
store operations, in terms of the supplier's expectations regarding 
the amount and type of inventory carried and the manner of payment. 
Conflict Response 
The second group of hypotheses dealt with the manner in which 
retailers initially handled conflict. The manner in which they 
responded was expected to vary with the nature of the power-dependency 
structure that characterized a given channel type, as well as by dealers' 
perceptions of the dependency relationship. 
TABLE VII 
DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE CONFLICT AMONG CHANNEL~TYPES CONCERNING ISSUE CATEGORIES 
Franchise Exclusive Multiple Univariate Multivariate 
Issue Category Operation Dealership Brand Dealer F Values Results 
Promotion 11.6 20.1 16.2 1. 70 
Supplier's Customer Service 12.5 13.3 10.8 0.35 Wilks' lambda = .8051 
Product Assortment 13.8 12.6 10.9 0.43 F(8,140) = 2.00 
Supplier's Operating Policy 8.0 15.8 7.8 6.17a p = .05 
Eta2 = .195 





Three modes of response were suggested. Retailers could respond 
cooperatively by attempting to understand the problem and seeking 
mutually beneficial solutions (cooperative response). They could 
overtly seek their self-interest through the use of persuasion, threats, 
or the use of third parties (competitive response). Or, they could 
unilaterally accommodate the wishes of the other party (acquiescence). 
Each mode of response was delineated in terms of specific actions 
that respondents might take in response to a conflict situation. 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale how frequently 
they employed these specific responses to handle disagreements with the 
supplier during the past 12 months. Acquiescence, cooperative and 
competitive responses were developed as multi-item measures by summing 
items responses that were associated respectively with each form of 
behavior. Three items were incorporated in each mode of response, as 
is indicated in Appendix D. 
To verify that the a priori selection of items for each response 
mode were internally consistent and independent of one another, a factor 
analysis of individual response items was performed as an internal 
check. Three factors were obtained, each with eigenvalues of greater 
than one. Collectively, they accounted for 58 percent of the variance 
in the data. The three variables with the highest loadings on each 
factor (loadings of .50 or better) were examined, with the results 
indicating that the constructs were independent and consisted of the 
items previously suggested. Consequently, empirical evidence of 
discriminant validity was provided. 
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The multi-item indices were employed as dependent variables in the 
testing of Hypotheses III and IV. Since a respondent might employ a 
variety of responses over time, it was expected that more than one type 
of response could appear over the relevant period of time. 
Structurally-Derived Dependency 
The nature of response to a conflict situation is likely to vary 
with a retailer's dependency upon the channel relationship. In Hypothesis 
III, channel structure was viewed as a surrogate measure of this power-
dependency relationship. Based on the reasoning stated in the previous 
chapter, the hypothesis is presented below in its alternative form: 
Hypothesis III: Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will 
differ by type of channel structure. Channel 
members in conventional channel arrangements will 
tend to exhibit less acquiescence, less cooperative 
bargaining behavior, and greater competitive 
bargaining behavior relative to members of 
alternative channel structures. 
A one-way MANOVA was employed to test if the three channel types 
were significantly different with respect to the three response modes 
considered simultaneously. The statistical findings are summarized in 
Table VIII. No significant global difference was found, F(6,144) = ;sz. 
Since the observed differences were not statistically significant, the 
directional nature of the latter half of the hypothesis was not examined. 
The preceding hypothesis was based on the traditional view from 
the literature that interdependence would be lowest among conventional 
members and, as argued previously in Chapter III, would affect the 
nature of response behavior. While average interdependence may vary 
over channel types, perceptions of the power-dependency relationship 
are likely to vary among member firms for each given channel type. 
TABLE VIII 
DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE TO CONFLICT ACROSS CHANNEL TYPES 
Franchise Exclusive Multiple Univariate 
Nature of Response Operation Dealerships Brand Dealer F Values 
11.0 12.1 10.2 1.44a 
Acquiescence 
(Unilateral Accommodation) 
Competitive Mode 11.4 9.7 10.4 0.90a 
Cooperative Mode 15.0 15.0 14.8 0.04a 
a p > .24. 
Multivariate 
Results 
Wilks' lambda = .9353 
F(6,144) = .82 





Consequently, the effects of interchannel differences may have been 
concealed by intrachannel differences. The nature of the relationship 
between response behavior and perceived dependency is examined below. 
Perceived Dependency 
Perceived dependency is viewed as directing a retailer's response 
to channel conflict. Although perceptions are associated with channel 
structure, within and over channels, individual perception will differ 
based on channel member characteristics, such as size of operation and 
number of years with the supplier. 
The level of cooperative behavior and acquiescence should vary 
directly with the level of perceived dependency, while the level of 
competitive behavior varies inversely. Furthermore, a dealer's 
perception of self and other firm dependency should interact at different 
levels to affect the nature of response to a conflict situation. Based 
on this rationale and arguments presented in the previous chapter, 
Hypothesis IV is stated below in its alternative form: 
Hypothesis IV: Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will 
differ according to the perceived channel power-
dependency relationship: 
(a) A retailer's acquiescence to a supplier's 
wishes should be associated with a high level 
of perceived dependency upon the supplier and 
a low level of supplier's dependency upon the 
retailer. 
(b) A retailer's use of competitive behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with 
a low level of perceived dependency upon the 
supplier and a high level of supplier's 
dependency upon the retailer. 
(c) A retailer's use of cooperative behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with 
a high level of perceived dependency upon the 
supplier and a high level of supplier's 
dependency upon the retailer. 
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(d) A retailer's use of competitive behavior in 
response to conflict should be associated with 
a low level of perceived dependency upon the 
the supplier and a low level of supplier's 
dependency upon the retailer. The level of 
competitive behavior exhibited should be less 
compared to that observed under conditions 
H IV-B. 
In the investigation of this group of hypotheses, retailers were 
asked to indicate their level of perceived dependency upon an adjacent 
supplier (Self-Perceived Dependency) and the supplier's dependency upon 
the retailer, as perceived by them (Attributed or Supplier Dependency). 
Dependency was measured by multi-item Likert scales that considered the 
amount of sales and profit contributed by a given arrangement and the 
availability of suitable alternative arrangements. 
As a check on the measures, coefficient alpha was computed to 
determine the internal consistency of each multi-item measure. The 
self-perceived and supplier indices respectively had reliability levels 
of .68 and .59. 
To test hypotheses on responses as related to perceived dependency, 
a 2x2 factorial arrangement was employed in the context of a completely 
randomized design: Self-Perceived Dependency (low-high) x Supplier 
Dependency (low-high). This allowed for the examination of the 
individual and combined effects of the independent variables. Respondents 
were divided into two groups (low-high) using the median measure for 
the first variable (Self-Perceived Dependency). Each of these groups 
was then further divided by using the median measure for the second 
variable (Supplier Dependency). This assignment method led to unequal 
cell sizes and was accounted for in the statistical analysis by using 
the GLM procedure in SAS. Since responses could be in three modes, 
the statistical analysis incorporated a one-way MANOVA procedure. 
The mean values for alternative response modes over the levels of 
dependency (Self and Supplier) are given in Table IX. The statistical 
findings are reported in Table X. Using the MANOVA procedure, self-
dependency was found to have a significant effect upon the response 
modes at the .03 level. Neither supplier or interaction effects were 
noted. 
A lack of a significant supplier effect may be explained by dealer 
uncertainty in estimating supplier dependency. Under perception of 
other-firm dependency, the dealer would have less accurate information 
regarding the importance of the channel relationship to the supplier 
than about the importance that it places upon the arrangement. Given 
the relative uncertainty of these estimates, less variability would be 
expected in supplier than self dependency. This was confirmed by the 
data. Consequently, the risks associated with a miscalculation of a 
supplier's dependency may account for the lack of a statistical 
difference in response behavior. 
Alternative responses were considered separately, as shown in 
Table X utilizing a 2x2 factorial arrangement in the context of a 
completely randomized design. Only competitive behavior showed a 
strongly significant effect. The self-perceived main effect and inter-
action effect were respectively significant at the .01 and .08 levels. 
The rest of the findings, although not statistically significant, were 
for the most part in the directions predicted by the sub-sections of 
Hypothesis IV. 
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As expected, the interaction effect of self and supplier dependency 
had a significant impact upon the level of competitive behavior. Figure 









TABLE IX • 
:t:-1Efu"l" RESPONSES FOR ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENCY CONDITIONS 
Self-Derendenc~ 
Low Hi h Main Effect SurElier Derendencl 
Cooperative Acquiescence Competitive Cooperative Acquiescence Competitive Cooperative Acquiescence 
14.5 9.9 10.2 15.4 11.3 10.7 14.8 10.3 
14.4 1!.3 8.7 15.4 ll. 5 9.9 15.1 ll. 5 





high levels of self dependency. The non-parallel lines representing 
low and high self dependency illustrates a moderately significant level 
of interaction. 
TABLE X 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE--EFFECTS OF DEPENDENCY ON RESPONSE 
Dependent Response Pattern 
Variables Source F Values P>F 
Multivariate: Self-Dependency 3.08 .03* 
Supplier Dependency 0.26 .86 
Interaction 1.22 .31 
Competitive: Self-Dependency 6.83 .01* 
Supplier Dependency 0.05 .81 
Interaction 3.18 .08* 
Cooperation: Self-Dependency 1.09 .30 
Supplier Dependency 0.00 .95 
Interaction 0.00 .96 
Acquiescence: Self-Dependency 0.54 .46 
Supplier Dependency 0.63 .43 
Interaction 0.39 .54 
* Significant findings. 
This finding indicates that retailer use of competitive actions 
will be at a maximum when they perceive their supplier to be more 
dependent upon the arrangement than themselves (i.e., low self and high 
supplier dependency). Given their perceived dominance, the risks of 

































Figure 2. Plot of Interaction Effect--Average Competitive 
Responses for Supplier Dependency at Low and 
High Levels of Self Dependency 
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will tend to devalue the contribution of subordinate members and employ 
more demanding means of influence in response to conflict (Wilkinson and 
Kipnis 1978). 
Alternatively, when retailers perceived a symmetrically higher 
dependence upon the relationship, the use of competitive behavior was 
at its minimum. A high commitment to the other party may have served to 
restrain the use of more coercive means of influence. 
Competitive behavior varied inversely with self dependency, as 
expected. As was illustrated in Figure 2, the significant"main effect 
was not confounded by the presence of the other independent variable. 
That is, across all levels of supplier dependency, a greater use of 
demanding-threatening actions was associated with a low level of retailer 
dependence upon the supplier. The opposite was true for the high level 
of self dependency. 
The use of more coercive means of influence may be explained by a 
low level of commitment to the channel arrangement. This level of 
commitment is likely to vary directly with the supplier's ability to 
contribute significantly to a dealer's economic goals and inversely 
with the availability of suitable alternative sources of supply. 
Proportional Use of Response Modes 
Although the nature of responses may be issue specific, channel 
members will exhibit a variety of responses in their dealings over 
time. To provide insights as to the relative use of alternative modes, 
the proportional use of responses was examined under each perceived 
combination of self and supplier dependency. The percentage of time in 
which dealers employed a given response to disagreements with their 
supplier during the previous year is reported in Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
PROPORTIONAL USE OF RESPONSE MODES CLASSIFIED BY PERCEIVED CONDITIONS 
Self-Perceived 
Dependencl on Supplier 
Supplier's Dependency Low High 
{Attributed) Competitive Cooperative Acquiescence Competitive Cooperative 
Low 31.0% 41.0% 27.9% 27.5% 41.8% 






When both parties were perceived by the retailer as being highly 
dependent upon the channel relationship (i.e., high self and high 
supplier dependence), the proportional use of cooperative behavior was 
at its maximum, while the· :use of competitive behavior was at its 
minimum for all combinations. Commitment to the relationship may have 
served to generate more cooperation and restrained the use of coercive 
means of influence. 
While these observations were expected, the maximum level of 
acquiescence was somewhat greater than expected. Retailers may uni-
laterally accommodate the wishes of the supplier on a number of issues 
because of the trust that they have in the supplier and the expertise 
that is attributed to him. 
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Although acquiescence varied directly in the expected direction 
with self dependency, it was assumed to be associated more with an 
asymmetrical, subordinate position (i.e., high self and low supplier 
dependence). Subordinate dealers were expected to enact a greater 
number of responses desired by a more dominant supplier. In addition, 
response behavior was likely to be more cooperative and less competitive 
in nature, given the dealer's weaker position and stake in the arrange-
ment. With the exception of a slightly lower relative use of 
acquiescence, such behavior was observed. 
Perhaps subordinate dealers may have held the view that disagree-
ments were futile and were more likely to cause repercussions. 
Alternatively, suppliers may have been perceived as having a legitimate 
right to expect cooperation because of their expertise. Judging from 
the observed level of overall satisfaction that was associated with 
this perceived condition, the latter explanation is more plausible. 
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When a retailer perceived itself to be less dependent upon the 
channel relationship than the supplier (i.e., low self and high supplier 
dependence), a dominant, asymmetrical condition was assumed. As 
expected, the proportional use of competitive behavior was at its 
maximum, while cooperative behavior was at its minimum for all combina-
tions. Consistent with a dominant position, the use of acquiescence 
was relatively low. As was previously mentioned, dominant dealers 
tend to devalue the contributions of subordinate suppliers and will 
employ more demanding actions in response to disagreements. 
When neither party is perceived as being highly dependent upon the 
other (i.e., low self and low supplier dependence), the proportional 
use of competitive behavior should be high relative to other combina-
tions; although not as high as that observed under the dominant 
condition. Such was the case here. This may be explained by a low 
commitment to the relationship and a dealer's low perceived ability to 
successfully exercise its influence. Consistent with low self 
dependency, the proportional use of acquiescence was observed at its 
minimum. 
Interestingly, when self dependency was low across both levels of 
supplier dependency, the proportional use of cooperative behavior was 
greater than the use of competitive behavior. This suggests that a 
minimum level of cooperation and understanding is necessary if the 
channel relationship is to survive and function effectively. 
Summary 
The objective of this chapter was a presentation of the research 
findings. The cross-channel stufty was undertaken to examine the nature 
of channel conflict in the home electronic industry and the manner in 
which these retailers handled disagreements with their suppliers. 
The collection procedure, along with a profile of respondents, were 
first considered. Results of the investigation for each of the major 
hypotheses were then presented and evaluated. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
A summary of the research study is presented in this final chapter. 
Limitations of the research are considered so that the findings may be 
placed in their proper perspective. Finally, implications for managerial 
action are presented, along with suggestions for future research. 
Research Summary 
The subject of this research was a cross-channel examination of 
conflict between retailers and their suppliers in the home electronics 
industry. Single unit retailers within alternative types of distribution 
channels represented the unit of analysis. 
The major hypotheses investigated pertained to: (1) the magnitude 
of conflict and type of issues that contributed to disagreements across 
channel types and (2) the nature of response behavior that was initially 
employed by dealers in resolving these disagreements. The findings 
with respect to the hypotheses are summarized in Table XII. 
In Hypothesis I, no significant differences in conflict was noted. 
Contrary to expectations, the magnitude of conflict experienced by 




SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Hypotheses 
I. The magnitude of intrachannel conflict perceived by retailers 
will differ by type of channel structure. Channel members in 
conventional channel arrangements will tend to perceive a 
high level of conflict relative to members of alternative 
structures. 
II-A. The magnitude of conflict that is experienced on individual 
policies will differ among channel types. 
II-B. Individual policies (issues) will fall into sets of conflict 
issues that reflect the same underlying construct (conflict 
type), such that they contribute differently to conflict 
across channel types. 
III. Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will differ by 
type of channel structure. Channel members in conventional 
channel arrangements will tend to exhibit less acquiescence, 
less cooperative behavior, and greater competitive behavior 
relative to members of alternative channel structures. 
IV. Retailer response to intrachannel conflict will differ 
according to the perceived channel power-dependency 
relationship. 
Results 
Not Statistically Supported 
Statistically Supported 
Statistically Supported 
Not Statistically Supported 




The findings of Hypothesis II revealed that the basis for conflict 
over channel types varies by channel policies (issues) when considered 
individually and as separate clusters of interrelated issues. Exclusive 
dealerships differed significantly from their channel counterparts, 
exhibiting a higher level of conflict on issues related to store 
operations. Supplier interference regarding these issues may have been 
perceived as a threat to dealer autonomy. This may be explained by 
channel members' differences in role expectations and business customs, 
both individually and over alternative channel types. 
It was expected that the manner in which retailers respond to 
disagreements would vary with the nature of the power-dependency relation-
ship. Assumed structurally-derived dependency had been suggested as 
affecting the nature of response behavior and was the basis for 
Hypothesis III. However, no statistically significant differences in 
response were noted over channel structures. 
It was hypothesized in Hypothesis IV that the nature of response 
behavior would be affected by the retailer's perception of the 
dependency relationship. A retailer's perception of its dependence 
upon a supplier (self dependency) was found to have a significant effect 
when all three response modes were considered simultaneously. Neither 
supplier or interaction effects were noted in the multivariate case. 
When the alternative response forms were considered separately, 
a significant effect was observed for one dependent variable, competi-
tive behavior. A moderate interaction effect and a strong self-
dependency effect were noted with respect to the use of this response 
mode. The use of demanding-threatening actions was at its maximum 
level when the retailer perceived the supplier to be more dependent 
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upon the channel arrangement than themselves. This finding provides 
empirical support for an observation made by Wilkinson and Kipnis (1978) 
that dominant members employ more coercive means of influence in 
response to conflict. 
The rest of the findings, although not statistically significant, 
were in the direction suggested by Hypothesis IV. The lack of a 
significant differencewith respect to cooperative behavior may be 
explained by the research focus on initial response behavior. Since 
initial responses may tend to be more cooperative, it is likely that 
a significant difference across perceived dependency conditions would 
be observed for subsequent actions in an unresolved conflict situation. 
Unlike most channel studies, this research involved a comparative 
examination of the channel relationship. The findings revealed that 
channel policies do contribute differently to intrachannel conflict 
across alternative types of distribution channels. Likewise, these 
problems were resolved differently as a function of perceived 
dependency. 
Research Limitations 
To place the findings of this study in their proper perspective, 
limitations of the research must be considered. Given the focus on a 
single industry, generalizability of the results to other industries 
may be precluded. There may be differences among industries with 
respect to business customs and dealer experiences. Also, since the 
research was confined to the upper mid-west, the findings may be limited 
to the area investigated. Economic conditions, that differ across 
regions, may influence the nature of conflict that is observed. 
The sample selected is not representative of all video and audio 
dealers. Attention was given to the shorter, more direct channel 
arrangements in which the manufacturer or franchisor served as the 
immediate supplier to the single unit retailer. This controlled for 
possible bias and lack of information that would have occurred given 
wholesalers as intermediaries. However, given their relative size, 
power, and position in the channel, manufacturers and franchisors are 
likely to differ from wholesalers with respect to their impact on 
conflict and response behavior. 
Further limitations pertain to the small response rate. Although 
the overall respQnse was comparable with that obtained in channel 
research, more meaningful results might have been obtained had cell 
responses been larger. This is particularly true with respect to the 
examination of response behavior, when unequal cell sizes were obtained 
after classifying respondents as to perceived dependency. 
Managerial Implications 
Retailers in alternative types of channels experience different 
problems and, depending upon the perceived nature of the channel 
relationship, resolve them differently. These findings have a number 
of managerial implications for suppliers. 
In the selection of distribution arrangements and the employment 
of marketing policies within and across these arrangements, suppliers 
must be cognizant of issues that contribute differently to conflict 
across channels. Often, marketingpolicies are hastily devised and 
ignore the circumstances in which they are to be implemented. Policies 
that may be desired because they facilitate a dealer's goal attainment 
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in one type of arrangement may be perceived as a source of interference 
in another. By focusing attention upon various issues and the conditions 
under which they are likely to develop into disagreements, a better 
understanding of the channel relationship may be obtained. This knowledge 
would enable suppliers to take steps that would reduce the potential for 
future conflict. 
Channel relations may be improved by the identification, development, 
and offering of valued resources that are necessary to the achievement 
of a dealer's goal. This would serve to enhance the importance of the 
relationship to the dealer; thereby, increasing the dealer's dependence 
upon the supplier. Associated with a high level of dependence is the 
high proportional use of cooperative response behavior, in which channel 
members attempt to find mu£ually beneficial solutions. 
Future Research 
A cross-sectional design was employed in this investigation, in 
which respondents were asked to recollect disagreements and each 
respondent's initial response behavior that occurred during the past 
year. This ignored changes in the nature of conflict over time as 
well as responses as the conflict relationship matured. The lack of a 
statistically significant difference in the use of cooperative responses 
may be explained by the research focus on the initial stage of response 
behavior. Subsequent response behavior in an unresolved conflict 
situation is likely to differ significantly across levels of perceived 
dependency. Consequently, a better understanding of channel conflict 
would be obtained from a longitudinal study that enabled conflict to 
be traced through the various stages of channel interaction. 
Response behavior varied with perceived dependency. If this 
finding is to have practical applications suppliers must be able to 
classify retailers in terms of characteristics that are more readily 
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identifiable. It is likely that variations in perceived dependency may 
be explained by differences in member characteristics, such as the level 
of experience and size of financial resources. Therefore, future 
research should examine the relationship between perceived dependency 
and various retailer characteristics. 
Future research should also examine the nature of channel behavior 
across industries to determine the external validity of these findings. 
Interindustry differences are likely to be observed given industry 
variations in the level of growth and technology. However, by 
systematically investigating alternative channels within and across 
industries, a better understanding of the channel relationship and the 
conditions under which it varies may be obtained. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE: FRANCHISE VERSION 
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SURVEY: HOME VIDEO/ AUDIO PRODUCT DEALERS 1 
This survey is concerned with the nature.of supplier-related issue• that affiliated (franchise) dealers cur-
rently experience in the merchandising of video or audio electronic products. Information collected will be held 
strictly confidential and not identified with your operation in any way. 
Here, we would like to determine if your establishment is affiliated with a franchise operation. Please 
note the definition below before responding. 
FRANCHISE OPERATION: Involves the liceaaia& of an entire business format (store operation) 
where a nuaber of independent retailers (franchisee) market a product or service and engage 
in a business developed by a firm (fraachisor) using the latter's trade names, trademarks, 
knowhow, and methods of doing business. 






(If your firm is not an affiliated (franchisee) dealer, please indicate your store's 
naae and address ~ return the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. Thank you 
for your assistance.) 
I 
IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" PLEASE REFER TO THE FRANCHISOR WHEN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS! 
CONCJ::R.''UNG T!IE SU!'Ptl ER BELOW. 1 
SECTION ONE 
The following section is concerned with your firm's overall relationship with the supplier of home electronic 
produces. 
Please CIRCLE the appropriace response that best rcf'rt"sents your le...-el of agreement or di~a~reer.ti'nt 11it:h 






!. My firm relies heavily upon the supplier u a source of 
supply for home electronic produces. 
2. My firm contributes significantly co the profitability 
that the supplier experiences from hoae electronic 
produces sold in the trade area. 
3. The quality and level of local support that my store 
provides is very appropriate for the needs of the 
supplier. 
4. The suoplier contributes significantly to the profit-
ability that my firm experiences in haae electronic 
produces. 
S. Other supply sources of al~ernacive brands are readily 
available to my firm.' 
6. The supplier relies heavily upon 11y store as a source 
of sales for h011e electronic produces in the trade 
area. 
7. M&Dy potential retail firma are readily available to 
represent the supplier in the trade area. 
8. The coat of my svitchin& to another supply source of 
alteraative brands would be greeter than the benefit 
achieved. 
6 4 













9. The quality and level of assistance offered by the 
supplier is very appropriate for the needs of my 
store. 
10. The cost to the supplier would be greater than the 
benefits achieved in switching from my store to an 




Disagreements between dealers and their suppliers may occur. We are interested in the nature of the disagree-
ments that your store experienced with the supplier. 
Think about all of the discussions over each of the following topics that your store had with the supplier 
during the past twelve months. Please CIRCLE the number that best indicates the percent of these discussions 
when your store and the supplier expressed disagreements (REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF DISAGREEMENT). If an issue 
was not discussed during the past year circle the not discussed "NO" response. 
There are no right or wrong answers since we are only interested in your feelings as to the frequency with 
which disagreements occurred. 
EXAMPLE 
PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
Customer Relations 0 10 20 @ 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
Physical Facility 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 \§) 
Community Relations ® 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
This store manager discussed customer relations with the supplier last year and disagreed during 30 per-
cent of these discussions. Physical Facility was not discussed last year, therefore, the "ND" not dis-
cussed response was circled. Community Relations was discussed last year but there was no disagreement 
over this issue. 
PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS: the amount 0 10 20 30" 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
or type of inventory that supplier 
expects you to carry. 
TERMS OF SALE: supplier's policy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
regarding length of payment 
period, discounts offered. 
REBATE PROGRAMS: your participa- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
tion in supplier-initiated rebate 
programs. 
PROMPTNESS OF DELIVERY: obtain- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
ing merchandise from the supplier 
in a reasonable time after place-
ment of the order. 
111 
PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
PRODUCT ASSORTMENT: availability 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
of desired product models, styles, 
colors, etc., in sufficient quan-
tities. 
STORE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCES: ap- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
propriateness of assistances in-
volving inventory control. 
SALES TRAINING ASSISTANCES: ap- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
propriateness of assistances of-
fered by supplier involving 
training of store personnel, 
sales manuals. 
SUPPLIER'S PRICE: supplier's 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
price levels permit adequate 
profits. 
RETURN POLl CY: supplier's policy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
regarding return of unsold goods 
or shipments of unordered merchan-
dise. 
WARRANTY POLl CY: supplier's pol- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
icy regarding replac~ent or re-
pair of defective merchandise. 
SALES PROMOTION: appropriateness 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
of in-store promotional assist-
ances. 
RETAIL AD FLEXIBILITY: your store's 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
flexibility to advertise locally, 
run specials. 
PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES: adequacy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
of allowances given to your store 
for local promotional effort. 
SUPPLIER ADVERTISING: the amount 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
and appropriateness of national, 
regional, and local advertising 
provided by supplier. 
STORE OPERATIONS: manner in which 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
your store is operated. 
BILLING ERRORS: manner in which 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
errors are handled. 
COMPLETE PRODUCT LINE: extent to 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
which supplier's line contains an 
adequate number of products that pos-
sess a range of features and price 
lines. 
NEW PRODUCTS: availability of new 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
products. 
INVENTORY FINANCING: adequacy of 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
assistances in financing inventory. 
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SECTION THREE 
Disagreements may vary in their intensity. For example, a store manager may disagree with the way the sup-
plier handles its customer relations. When the manager jokingly asks, 'Vhen is the supplier going to clean up 
its customer relations problem?" the supplier jokingly responds 'Vhat problem?" This is an example of a VERY LOW 
level of disagreement. An example of a VERY HIGH level of disagreement would be when the parties have a very 
heated argument, with both losing their tempers and calling each other names. 
Recall the previous issues over which you had disagreements. Please indicate the typical LEVEL of disagree-
ment that you experienced on each of the issues, regardless of whether the disagreements were settled or not. 
Level of Disagreements 
VERY LOW VERY HIGH 
INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS 4 6 
TERMS OF SALE 2 3 4 5 6 
REBATE PROGRAMS 4 6 
PROMPTNESS OF DELIVERY 4 6 
PRODUCT ASSORTMENT 4 6 
STORE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCES 2 4 5 6 
SALES TRAINING ASSISTANCES 4 6 
SUPPLIER'S PRICE 4 6 
RETURN POLICY 4 6 
WARRANTY POLICY 4 6 
SALES PROMOTION 4 6 
RETAIL AD FLEXIBILITY 2 4 6 
PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 4 6 
SUPPLIER ADVERTISING 4 6 
STORE OPERATIONS 3 4 6 
BILLING ERRORS 4 6 
COMPLETE PRODUCT LINE 3 4 6 
NEW PRODUCTS 2 4 6 
INVENTORY FINANCING 2 4 6 
SECTION FOUR 
When disagreements do arise between your finn and the supplier, we are interested in the manner by which 
they are initially handled. Naturally, they may be resolved differently at a later tillle. 
Please CIRCLE how frequently you employed the following methods to initially handle disagreements with the 
supplier during the last twelve months. 
VERY VERY 
FREQUENTLY INFREQUENTLY 
1. I try to work with the supplier to 6 4 
solve any disagreements. 
2. t accommodate the supplier's position 6 4 
without the expectation of a conces-
sion being given in return. 
3. I attempt to resolve the disagreement 6 5 4 2 
illllllediately, even if feelings are 
likely to get hurt. 
4. I use third parties, such as dealer 6 4 
or trade associations, to support 
my view. 
5. t refrain from argument, by modify- 7 6 4 
ing my behavior to accommodate the 
supplier's viewpoint. 
6. I attempt to find a mutually satis- 6 5 4 
factory solution, even though it may 
require some adjusrments on my part. 
7. I attempt to understand the supplier's 6 4 2 
viewpoint fully before taking any 
kind of action. 
8. live with the supplier's wishes. 6 5 4 
9. I use whatever power that I have to 6 5 4 3 
win acceptance of my point of view. 
10. I play down the differences between 6 5 4 
my store and the suppliar and 
emphasize common interests. 
11. I attempt, through the use of argu- 6 4 
meDts. to parsuade tha supplier 
that my point of view has 1110re 
merit than theirs. 
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SECTION FIVE 
In this section, we would like to get some of your overall feelings regarding a number of issues. Please 
CIRCLE the appropriate response. 


























In this last section, we would like to collect some routine statistical information about your retail estab-
lishment and trade area. 
l. What was the approximate unemployment rate for your city or trade area during the last twelve months? 
(PLEASE CHECK) 
less than 4% lO - l2% 
4 - 6% l3 - l5% 
7 - 9% ______ greater than l57. 
2. How long has your retail establishment been in business? 
------ years in operation 
3 •. How long has the relationship with the franchisor existed? 
------years relationship with franchisor. 
4. What is the approximate size of your store? 
______ square footage 
5. Please indicate the tradename under which the franchise opera~es. 
APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE: NON-FRANCHISE VERSION 
ll5 
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SURVEY: VIDEO HOME ELECTRONICS RETAILERS 
This survey is concerned with the nature of supplier-related issues that retail establishments, such as your 
own, currently experience. Information collected will be held strictly confidential and not identified with your 
operation in any way. 
Although your establishment may sell different categories of products, we ask that you focus your attention 
upon the VIDEO ROME ELECTRONIC CATEGORY (TV's, video cassette recorders, etc.) in responding to the survey. 
Please identify in your mind a BRAND of video electronic products in which you have had 
the HOST DEALINGS WITH A MANUFACTURER, rather than with a distributor or buying group. 
rMPORTANT: Please refer to this MANUFACTURER when answering questions regarding the 
SUPPLIER below. 
SECTION ONE 
The following section is concerned with your firm's overall relationship with the supplier of home electronic 
products. 
Please CIRCLE the appropriate response that best represents your level of agreement or disagreement with 
each of the statements below.· 
Very Strongly Very Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
l. ~y firm relies heavily upon the supplier as a source of 6 5 4 
supply for home electronic products. 
2. My firm aontributes significantly to the profitability 6 4 
that the supplier experiGnces from home electronic 
products sold in the trade area. 
3. The quality and level of local support that my store 6 5 4 
provides is very appropriate for the needs of the 
SUP!'lier. 
4. The supplier contributes significantly to the profit- 6 
ability that my firm experiences in home electronic 
produce.. 
5. Other supply sourcee of alternative brands are readily 6 4 2 
available to my firm. 
6. The supplier relies heavily upon my store as a source 6 4 
of sales for home electronic products in the trade 
area. 
7. Many potential retail firms are readily available to 6 5 4 2 
represent the supplier in the trade area. 
8. The cost of my switching to another supply source of 4 
alternative brands would be great:er than the benefit 
achieved. 






9. The quality and level of assistance offered by the 
supplier is very appropriate for the needs of my 
store. 
10. The cost to the supplier would be greater than the 
benefits achieved in switching from my store to an 




Disagreements between dealers and their suppliers may occur. We are interested in the nature of the disagree-
ments that your store experienced with the supplier. 
Think about all of the discussions over each of the following topics that your store had with the supplier 
during the past twelve months. Please CIRCLE the number that best indicates the percent of these discussions 
when your store and the supplier expressed disagreements (REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF DISAGREEMENT). If an issue 
was not discussed during the past year circle the not discussed 11 ND" response. 
There are no right or wrong answers since we are only interested in your feelings as to the frequency with 
which di~agreements occurred. 
EXAMPLE 
PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
j Customer Relations 
I 
0 10 20 @ 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 !11) 
I Physical Facility 
Community Relations 
This store manager discussed 
, cent of these discussions. 
0 10 20 
® 10 20 
customer relations with 
Physical Facility was not 
-----30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ~ 
30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
the supplier last year and disagreed during 30 per-
discussed last year, therefore, the "ND" not dis-
I cussed response was circled. 
) over this issue. 
Community Relations was discussed last year but there was no disagreement 
PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS: the amount 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 !11) 
or type of inventory that su]lplier 
ex pee ts you to carry. 
TERMS OF SALE: supplier'• policy 0 10 20 JO 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 !11) 
regarding length of payment 
period, discounts offered. 
REBATE PROGRAMS: your partie ipa- 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
tion in supplier-initiated rebate 
programs. 
PROMPTNESS OF DELIVERY: obtain- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ND 
ing merchandise from the" supplier 
in a reasonable time after place-
ment of the order. 
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PERCENT 
Never Always Not 
Disagree Disagree Discussed 
PRODUCT ASSORTMENT: availability 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
of desired product models, styles, 
colors, etc., in sufficient quan-
tities. 
STORE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE$: ap- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
propriateness of assistances in-
volving inventory control. 
SALES TRAINING ASSISTANCE$: ap- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
propriateness of assistances of-
fered by supplier involving 
training of store personnel, 
sales manuals. 
SUPPLIER'S PRICE: supplier's 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
price levels permit adequate 
profits. 
RETURN POll CY: supplier's policy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
regarding return of unsold goods 
or shipments of unordered merchan-
dis e. 
WARRANTY POLICY: supplier's pol- () 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
icy regarding replacement or re-
pair of defective merchandise. 
SALES PROMOTION: appropriateness 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
of in-store promotional assist-
ances. 
RETAIL AD FLEXIBILITY: your store's 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 I-'D 
flexibility to advertise locally, 
run specials. 
PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES: adequacy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
of allowances given to your store 
for local promotional effort. 
SUPPLIER ADVERTISING: the amount 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
and appropriateness of national, 
regional, and local advertising 
provided by sup.plier. 
STORE OPERATIONS: manner in which 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
your store is operated. 
BILLING ERRORS: manner in which 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
errors are handled. 
COMPLETE PRODUCT LINE: ex'tent to 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
which supplier's line contains an 
adequate number of products that pos-
sess a range of features and price 
lines. 
NEW PRODUCTS: availability of new 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
products. 
INVENTORY FINANCING: adequacy of 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 NO 
assistance& in financing ittventory. 
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SECTION THREE 
Disagreements may vary in their intensity. For example, a store manager may disagree with the way the sup-
plier handles its customer relations. When the manager jokingly asks, "When is the supplier going to clean up 
its customer relations problem?" the supplier jokingly responds "What problem?" This is an example of a VERY LOW 
level of disagreement. An example of a VERY HIGH level of disagreement would be when the parties have a very 
heated argument, with both losing their tempers and calling each other names. 
Recall the previous issues over which you had disagreements. Please indicate the typical LEVEL of disagree-
ment that you experienced on each of the issues, regardless of whether the disagreements were settled or not. 
Level of Disagreements 
VERY LOW VERY HIGH 
INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS 4 6 
TERliS OF SALE 4 
REBATE PROGRAMS 5 6 
PROMPTNESS OF DELIVERY 5 6 
PRODUCT ASSORTMENT 4 5 6 
STORE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCES 4 5 
SALES TRAINING ASSIST~~CES 4 6 
SUPPLIER'S PRICE 2 6 
RETURN POLICY 4 6 
WARRANTY POLICY 4 6 
SALES PROMOTION 4 5 6 
RETAIL AD FLEXIBILITY 2 4 5 6 
PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 4 5 6 
SUPPLIER ADVERTISING 4 5 
STORE OPERATIONS 2 4 5 6 
BILLING ERRORS 2 5 6 
COMPLETE PRODUCT LINE 4 5 6 
NEW PRODUCTS 2 4 5 6 
INVENTORY FINANCING 2 4 5 6 
SECTION FOUR 
When disagreements do arise between your firm and the supplier, ~e are interested in the manner by ~hich 
they are initially handled. Naturally, they may be resolved differently at a later time. 
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Please CIRCLE how frequently you employed the following methods to initially handle disagreements ~ith the 
supplier during the last twelve months. 
1. I try to work with the supplier to 
solve any disagreements. 
2. I accommodate the supplier's position 
without the ex~ectation of a conces• 
sion being given in return. 
3. I attempt to resolve the disagreement 
immediately, even if feelings are 
likely to get hurt. 
4. I use third parties, such as dealer 
or trade associations, to support 
my view. 
5. I refrain fro. argument, by modify-
ing my behavior to accommodate the 
supplier's viewpoint. 
6. I attempt to find a mutually satis-
factory solution, even though it may 
require some adjustments on my part. 
7. I attempt to understand the supplier's 
viewpoint fully before taking any 
kind of action. 
8. I live with the supplier's wishes. 
9. I use whatever power that I have to 
win acceptance of my point of view. 
10. I play down the differences between 
my store and the supplier and 
emphasize common incerests. 
11. I attemt>t, through the use of argu-
DS.ents., to persuade the supplier 
that my point of view has more 




































In this section, we would like to get some of your overall feelings regarding a number of issues. Please 
CIRCLE the appropriate response. 

























tn this last section, we would like to collect some routine statistical information about your retail estab-
lishment and trade area. 
1. What was the approximate unemployment rate for your city or trade area during the last twelve months? 
(PLEASE CHECK) 
less than 4% 7 - 9% 13 - 15% 
4 - 6% 10 - 12% ___ greater than 157. 
2. How long has your retail establishment been in business? 
------ years in operation 
3. How long has the relationship with the previously identified supplier existed? 
______ years relationship with supplier 
4. What is the approximate size of your store? 
______ square footage 
5. How many manufacturers' brands do you carry within the video electronic product line? (PLEASE CHECK) 
one manufacturer's brand exclusively 
brands from two or more manufacturers 
6. If you carried t~ or more manufacturers brands, approximately what percentage of your total video electronic 
sales did the previously identified ~ account for? 
% of total video electronic sales 
7. Of your total dealing• involving the previously identified~. approximately what percent of these dealings 
involved the manufactur•r, rather than a distributor or buying group? 
------ % of total dealings with manufacturer 
APPENDIX C 
COVER AND FOLLOW-UP LETTERS 
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May, 1982 
Dear Midwest Retailer: 
Northern Illinois University L1 
DeKalb. lllino1s 60115 
Department of Marketing 
815 753 1140 
As a faculty member at Northern Illinois University, I am conducting 
a study of retailers that merchandise various types of home electronic 
products. The survey is concerned with the nature of supplier-related 
issues that establishments, such as your own, currently experience. 
You'r cooperation is requested in completing the enclosed questionnaire. 
The questionnaire has been designed so that it can be completed quickly. 
Please note that there are no right or wrong answers, since I am inter-
ested only in your feelings regarding a number of issues. 
Your answers will not be identified with you or your firm. They will 
only be used in combined statistical form. 
By examining the supplier-retailer relationship, it is hoped that a 
better understanding will be achieved regardi.ng the nature of the pro-
blems and issues that are currently experienced by your industry. A 
summary report, that collectively summarizes the feelings of fellow 
dealers, will be made available upon completion of the study. If you 
would like a copy, please jot your name and address on the enclosed 
questionnaire or indicate by separate post card or letter. 
Your participation is vital to the success of this study. A postage-
paid return envelope has been enclosed for your convenience. 
Thank you for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, 
'"¥{ , 1 t 1i,tf; 
JeffreCJ.:hilts) 




May 27, 1982 
Dear Midwest Retailer: 
Northern Illinois University L1 
DeKalb, Illinois 60115 
Department of Marketing 
815 753 1140 
Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for your participation 
in a survey of supplier-dealer relations, 
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this 
letter a "thank you" for your valuable help. 
If you have not had a chance to do so yet, may I ask you to return 
the completed form? Your participation is vital to the success of this 
study. A copy of the questionnaire and a postage-paid return envelope 
is enclosed for your convenience. 
In return for your assistance, I will send you a summary of industry 
responses that highlights the views of fellow dealers. If you would like 
a copy, please include your name and address or indicate by separate post 
card or letter. 
Thank you for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, C &J~ 
Jef~ 
Assistant Professor of Marketing 
bee 
Enc. 
Northern Illinois UmverSify 1S an EQual Opoortumty,Aftirmattve Action Employer 
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June 16, 1982 
Dear Hidwest Retailer: 
Northern Illinois University~ 
DeKalb, Illinois 60115 
Department of Marketing 
815 753 1140 
Recently a questionnaire was mailed to you asking for your 
participation in a survey of supplier-dealer relations. 
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider 
this letter a "thank you" for your valuable help. 
If you have not 
the completed form? 
study, 
had a chance to do so yet, may I ask you to return 
Your participation is vital to the success of this 
In return for your assistance, I will send you a summary of 
industry responses that highlights the views of fellow dealers. If 
you would like a copy, please include your name and address or indicate 
by separate post card or letter. 
Thank you for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, 
-\)icc·'-'\(' 
Jeffr;l • Dil}s 
As~t Professor of Marketing 








1. I use whatever power that I have to win acceptance of my point 
of view. 
2. I attempt, through the use of arguments, to persuade the 
supplier that my point of view has more merit than theirs. 
3. I use third parties, such as dealer or trade associations, to 
support my view. 
Cooperative Mode 
1. I attempt to find a mutually satisfactory solution, even though 
it may require some adjustments on my part. 
2. I attempt to understand the supplier's viewpoint fully before 
taking any kind of action. 
3. I play down the differences between my store and the supplier 
and emphasize common interests. 
Acquiescence (Unilateral Accommodation) 
1. I accommodate the supplier's position without the expectation 
of a concession being given in return. 
2. I refrain from argument, by modifying my behavior to 
accommodate the supplier's viewpoint. 
3. I live with the supplier's wishes. 
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